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Abstract 
This PhD thesis has been developed mainly at the Ansaldo Nucleare S.p.A. headquarters in 
Genoa, in strict collaboration and with the support of Ansaldo and Westinghouse 
personnel. The main topics of the present work are some peculiar preoperational tests 
which will be performed on the first three built of the AP1000
®
 nuclear power plants and 
two Design Basis Accidents analyses performed to investigate and confirm the benefits of 
a suitable combination of active and passive features of the plant. The first part of the work 
covers one of the steps needed for the AP1000 licensing process and in particular for the 
Combined Construction and Operating License. In fact, in the AP1000 design certification 
(which constitutes the Appendix D to the 10 CFR 52 and, hence, it is a law for the United 
States of America) it is clearly stated that, because of the first of a kind safety systems 
characteristics of this plant, additional tests (“additional” with respect to the “traditional” 
commissioning ones) are required in order to prove, on the first three built nuclear plants, 
that the new features will operate as expected. Such tests must be performed before nuclear 
fuel can be loaded and power production started. 
In the first part of this thesis, three of these pre-operational tests have been considered: 
1) Core Make-up Tanks hot recirculation test; 
2) Core Make-up Tanks draindown test; 
3) Automatic Depressurization System test. 
Tests procedures have been developed in collaboration with Westinghouse and pre-tests 
calculations have been performed by means of the Relap5 computer code. To this aim, a 
detailed AP1000 Relap5 model has been developed and validated.  
The second part of the thesis focuses on the benefits which can come by suitably 
combining active and passive features. In fact, even if the safety related systems of the 
AP1000 are all passive, active systems are anyway present and could be available 
following an accident.  
Analyzing two Design Basis Accidents, a 1” Cold Leg Small Break LOCA and an 
Inadvertent Automatic Depressurization System Actuation, it is demonstrated that a 
suitable combination of passive systems and active ones can decrease the impact on the 
containment of the selected accidents, allowing a faster plant recovery and thus increasing 
availability of the plant. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that, should the active 
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feature fail once it has been aligned, passive systems remain available and would restart 
operation, so that no safety issue is raised due to the “interaction” between passive and 
active systems.  
The main motivation of this second part of the work is, in fact, the investigation of 
“interaction” between passive and active systems. For plants which base their safety on 
passive systems and are licensed taking into account only passive safety features, 
interaction between active and passive systems can be considered to investigate the 
possible benefits (if any, mainly in term of plant availability) so that suitable accident 
management procedures can be developed.  
In the following, section 1 details the motivations for the present work, section 2 reports a 
summary of the AP600 and AP1000 Westinghouse test program conducted during the 
Design Certification of the two designs, section 3 describes the developed Relap5 AP1000 
model, section 4 and section 5 focus on the pre-operational tests and Design Basis 
Accidents analyses (with suitable combination of active and passive safety systems) 
respectively. Conclusions are drown in section 6. 
 
The present work has been developed strictly following the Ansaldo Nucleare S.p.A. 
Quality Assurance Procedures.  
 
 
AP1000
®
 is a trademark or registered trademark in the United States of Westinghouse Electric 
Company LLC, its subsidiaries and/or its affiliates. This mark may also be used and/or registered in 
other countries throughout the world. All rights reserved. Unauthorized use is strictly prohibited. 
Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners. 
©2012 Westinghouse Electric Company LLC 
All Rights Reserved 
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1. Introduction 
The well-known Figure 1 (Generation IV International Forum, 2012) shows the different 
nuclear power plants generations: it can be seen how, nowadays, the so-called generation 
III systems are the current operating ones, while generation III+ systems have been 
designed and some of them are in an advanced construction stage (some even in 
operation).  
In the context of advancing the operating systems to more reliable, safe and secure ones, 
the Westinghouse Electric Company research in conceiving and developing an advanced 
but still based on proven technology nuclear reactor has been fulfilled in the design of the 
AP600 (Tower et al., 1998), a nuclear power plant in which all the safety related functions 
depend on passive systems with no operator action. The commercially available AP1000 
plant design (Schulz, 2006), a generation III+ system, was developed starting from AP600 
to be more cost competitive. This is the main reason for which Westinghouse initiated the 
effort of developing the AP1000 design, which retains all the basic characteristics of the 
AP600 design. In this design, passive systems are used for core cooling, containment 
isolation and containment cooling, and maintenance of main control room emergency 
habitability: following any design basis event, passive safety systems can maintain the 
power plant in safe conditions for an indefinite period of time with no or very limited 
operator action and no on-site or off-site AC power sources
1
. This plant is now being built 
in two locations in China (Sheng Zhou and Xiliang Zhang, 2010).  
While a detailed description of the AP1000 design can be found in Schulz (2006), also 
section 3 (in which the developed AP1000 Relap5 model is described) of this thesis offers 
some interesting details of this plant.  
Next section 1.1 details the AP1000 passive approach to a LOCA.        
                                                          
1
 The plant can cope against all the Design Basis Accidents for 72 hours. After that time, simple water 
transfer actions, consisting essentially in restoring the Passive Containment Cooling Water Tank (see section 
1.1) inventory, can extend the grace period practically indefinitely.  
9 
 
 
Figure 1: Nuclear Power Plants generations (from Generation IV International Forum 
website) 
 
1.1. AP1000 passive approach to a LOCA 
Figure 2 shows a scheme of the AP1000 passive safety injection system. There are three 
sources of passive safety injection, in addition to the recirculation of the containment 
sumps; they provide coolant to the RCS via two independent and redundant Direct Vessel 
Injection (DVI) lines. In case of a LOCA, the reactor is tripped and the two Core Make-up 
Tanks (CMTs) provide for immediate coolant make-up and boration. The CMTs are 
connected to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) through a discharge injection line and a 
cold leg inlet pressure balance line. The discharge line is isolated by two normally closed, 
parallel air-operated isolation valves that open on a loss of air pressure or electrical power. 
The pressure balance line is normally open to maintain the CMTs at RCS pressure and it is 
well insulated and routed continuously upward from the top of the cold leg to a high point 
close to the top of the CMT. This arrangement ensures that the water in the line will remain 
hot, which will provide for natural circulation injection of the CMT water, as the discharge 
line valves open. The CMTs can operate in two different modes, depending on the RCS 
conditions. If the cold legs are filled with water, CMTs operate in a water recirculation 
mode driven by the differential density due to the hot reactor coolant in the CMT balance 
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line and the colder water within the CMT. If the cold legs become voided, as they do 
during LOCAs, the CMTs will operate in a steam-displacement (or compensated) injection 
drain-down mode. In this mode, the driving force is based on gravity and the density 
difference between steam from the cold legs and water in the CMTs (Westinghouse 2010). 
Two ACCumulators (ACCs) are also provided which can inject borated water whenever 
the RCS pressure becomes lower than the ACCs nitrogen cover gas pressure.  
The IRWST water is available for RCS makeup: the atmospheric IRWST can inject into 
the RCS whenever the RCS pressure becomes lower than the IRWST water head.  The 
injection of the ACCs and IRWST is dependent on the depressurization of the RCS, which 
can be “controlled” via the Automatic Depressurization System. The ADS consists of two 
identical trains of four stages each: the first three stages are connected to the pressurizer 
dome and discharge within the IRWST through two spargers, while the fourth stages are 
connected to the RCS hot legs and discharge directly in the containment loop 
compartments.  The ADS is capable, if needed, to depressurize the plant so that the gravity 
driven water injection from IRWST is available. Finally, the AP1000 containment is 
configured such that the water from the postulated break (including the safety injection 
water) floods the lower portion of the containment to an elevation above the RCS loop 
piping. This water is returned to the reactor through two redundant and diverse 
containment recirculation paths. 
The decay heat is evacuated through the Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat eXchanger 
(PRHR-HX), which is located in the IRWST: heat is transferred to the initially cold water 
contained in the IRWST by natural circulation of the RCS water. In this way decay power 
is transferred from the primary coolant to the IRWST water which heats up and eventually 
boils. The produced steam is passively condensed on the inner containment steel surface by 
means of the Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS, illustrated in Figure 3) and re-
directed in the IRWST via a gutter system. The PCS cools the containment following any 
event which results in energy release into the containment so that containment design 
pressure is not exceeded and pressure inside containment is rapidly reduced. The steel 
containment vessel provides the heat transfer surface that removes heat from inside the 
containment and transfers it to the ultimate heat sink, the atmosphere. Heat is removed by 
passively spraying water onto the outside surface of the containment steel shell, where the 
water is heated and evaporates into the cooling passive air flow path. The water is provided 
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from a tank located on top of the containment shield building and drains by gravity by 
opening either one of two, normally closed, fail-open valves in parallel lines, or by opening 
diverse, battery powered, motor operated valve in a third flow path. 
 
Figure 2: AP1000 passive safety injection system scheme 
 
 
Figure 3: AP1000 Passive Containment Cooling System 
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From what reported above, it can be understood how this plant, whose nuclear safety is 
based entirely on passive systems, is really a first of a kind. This peculiarity has had and 
has some consequences on the AP1000 licensing process, which is described in some detail 
in the next sections.  
 
1.2. 10 CFR 52 and AP1000 licensing process 
The AP1000 nuclear power plant is licensed according to the 10 CFR Part 52 (United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission): this new licensing procedure is schematized in 
Figure 4. Essentially the applicant has to obtain a Combined Construction and Operating 
License (COL) in order to operate a nuclear power plant. In applying for a COL, an Early 
Site Permit (ESP) and/or a Standard Design Certification (SDC) can be referenced - if the 
case - in order to allow early resolution of the request. In fact safety and environmental 
issues already resolved in the ESP and SDC are not re-considered during a COL 
application. Following paragraphs give details on each of the three steps (from NRC 
website).    
 
Figure 4: NRC 10 CFR 52 licensing process (from NRC website) 
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1.2.1. Early Site Permit 
Under the NRC’s regulations in 10 CFR Part 52, the agency can issue an early site permit 
for approval of one or more sites separate from an application for a construction permit or 
combined license. Such permits are valid for 10 to 20 years and can be renewed for an 
additional 10 to 20 years. They address site safety issues, environmental protection issues, 
and plans for coping with emergencies, independent of the review of a specific nuclear 
plant design. The scheme for ESP granting is reported in Figure 5.  
An application for an early site permit must contain the following information: 
 the boundaries of the site, including a discussion of the exclusion area for which the 
applicant has the authority to remove or exclude persons or property; 
 characteristics of the site, including seismic, meteorologic, hydrologic, and 
geologic data; 
 the location and description of any nearby industrial, military, or transportation 
facilities and routes; 
 the existing and projected future population of the area surrounding the site, 
including a discussion of the expected low-population zone around the site and the 
locations of the nearest population centers; 
 an evaluation of alternative sites to determine whether there is any obviously 
superior alternative to the proposed site; 
 the proposed general location of each plant on the site;  
 the number, type, and power level of the plants, or a range of possible plants 
planned for the site;  
 the maximum radiological and thermal effluents expected; 
 the type of cooling system expected to be used; 
 radiological dose consequences of hypothetical accidents; 
 plans for coping with emergencies. 
 
 
14 
 
 
Figure 5: ESP granting process (from NRC website) 
 
Once the application has been sub-mitted, NRC staff conducts its review according to the 
applicable standards set out in 10 CFR part 50 (US-NRC) and its appendices and 10 CFR 
part 100 (US-NRC). Several meetings allowing public participation are integral part of the 
review process. NRC produces a safety evaluation report which, together with the 
application, is reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS, an 
independent advisory group of technical experts) in a public meeting. The ACRS reports 
results of the review to the NRC’s five members Commission. Finally decision on issuance 
of the ESP is taken according to the whole produced documentation. 
As an example, Figure 6 reports the ESP applications in US.   
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Figure 6: ESP applications in US (from NRC website) 
 
1.2.2. Standard Design Certification 
Figure 7 shows the Standard Design Certification (SDC) granting process. By issuing a 
design certification, NRC approves a nuclear power plant design, independent of an 
application to construct or operate a plant. A design certification is valid for 15 years, but 
can be renewed for an additional 10 to 15 years. An application for a standard design 
certification must contain a detailed description of the design, including the proposed tests, 
inspections, analyses, and acceptance criteria. Once the application is received, NRC staff 
reviews it in accordance to the applicable documentation (e. g. NUREG-800, US-NRC) 
and produces a safety evaluation report (several meetings allowing public participation are 
integral part of the review process). The ACRS reviews each application for a standard 
design certification, together with the NRC staff’s safety evaluation report, in a public 
meeting. The ACRS reports results of the review to the NRC’s five members Commission. 
If the design is acceptable, the NRC staff can then certify it through a rulemaking. Under 
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this process, the NRC publishes a public notice of the proposed rule in the Federal Register 
seeking public comments. The NRC reviews the comments and makes any changes to the 
final rule, which is then published in the Federal Register and becomes an appendix to the 
10 CFR Part 52 of the regulations. 
As an example, Figure 8 reports the SDC applications in US. 
 
 
Figure 7: SDC granting process (from NRC website) 
 
 
Figure 8: SDC applications in US (from NRC website) 
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1.2.3. Combined Construction and Operating License 
Figure 9 shows the Combined Construction and Operating License (COL) granting 
process. By issuing a COL, the NRC authorizes the licensee to construct and (with 
specified conditions) operate a nuclear power plant at a specific site, in accordance with 
established laws and regulations. A COL is valid for 40 years and can be renewed for an 
additional 20 years. The application for a combined license must contain essentially the 
same information required in an application for an operating license issued under 10 CFR 
Part 50. The application must also describe the Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and 
Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) that are necessary to ensure that the plant has been properly 
constructed and will operate safely: 
 Analysis: To be used when verification can be accomplished by calculation, 
mathematical computation, or engineering or technical evaluations of the as-built 
structures, systems, or components. 
 Inspection: To be used when verification can be accomplished by visual 
observations, physical examinations, review of records based on visual 
observations, or physical examinations that compare the as-built structure, system, 
or component condition to one or more design description commitments. 
 Test: to be used when verification can be accomplished by the actuation or 
operation, or establishment of specified conditions, to evaluate the performance or 
integrity of the as-built structures, systems, or components.  
An application for a combined license may reference a standard design certification, an 
early site permit, both, or neither. If the application references a standard design 
certification, the applicant must perform the inspections, tests and analyses for the certified 
design (see section 1.2.2). If the application does not reference a standard design 
certification, the applicant must provide complete design information, including the 
information that they would otherwise have submitted for a standard design certification. If 
the application references an early site permit, the applicant must demonstrate that the 
design of the plant is compatible with the early site permit. The application must also 
include information on those issues that were not required with the early site permit 
application, such as the need for power from the proposed plant. If the application does not 
reference an early site permit, the applicant must provide the site information that would be 
included in an early site permit. 
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Once the application is received, NRC staff reviews it in accordance with the Atomic 
Energy Act (United States Atomic Energy Commission, 1954), NRC regulations (e.g. 
NUREG-800, US-NRC) and the National Environmental Policy Act (US government). 
Several meetings allowing public participation are integral part of the review process. NRC 
produces a safety evaluation report. The ACRS reviews the application for a combined 
license, together with the NRC staff’s safety evaluation report, in a public meeting. The 
ACRS reports results of the review to the NRC’s five members Commission. Finally the 
decision is taken.  
After issuing a combined license, the NRC verifies that the licensee has completed the 
required Inspections, Tests, and Analyses, and that the Acceptance Criteria have been met 
before the plant can operate. In fact, during and following the construction, Inspections, 
preoperational Tests and Analyses are performed to demonstrate that equipment and 
systems perform in accordance with the Acceptance Criteria so that initial fuel loading, 
initial criticality, and subsequent power operation can be safely undertaken. 
As an example Figure 10 reports COL applications in US.  
 
Figure 9: COL granting process (from NRC website) 
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Figure 10: COL applications in US (from NRC website) 
 
1.2.4. The AP1000 case 
A good summary of the AP1000 licensing history can be found in Schulz (2006). Actually 
AP1000 licensing process started very early in 1992 when AP600 safety analysis and 
probabilistic risk assessment reports were submitted to the NRC. The Commission 
documented its acceptance of the AP600 plant in the Final Design Approval (FDA) on 
September 3, 1998. In December 1999, the NRC issued the Design Certification for AP600 
as Appendix C of 10CFR Part 52. This made the AP600 the only licensed passive safety 
system nuclear power plant in the world. Because of the first of a kind features of this 
plant, several experimental campaigns were needed in order to validate the design of the 
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new systems and to qualify the safety analysis codes (see section 2). A detailed summary 
of these experimental campaigns can be found in the AP600 Final Safety Evaluation 
Report (NUREG-1512).   
On March 28, 2002, Westinghouse submitted to US NRC an application for Final Design 
Approval and Design Certification of the AP1000 standard plant, based on the Revision 0 
of the AP1000 Design Control Document (DCD, Westinghouse, 2002). The NRC formally 
docketed the application on June 25, 2002 signifying its acceptance as a complete safety 
case.  
Because of the few design changes from AP600, approximately 80% of the AP600 
Standard Safety Analysis Report remains unchanged for AP1000. In particular NRC found 
the codes and test programs used for AP600 licensing applicable also to the AP1000 
design, with few exceptions which required further testing (see section 2.4 and AP1000 
Final Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG-1793).  
After review of the submitted documentation and sub-sequent versions of the AP1000 
DCD, on January 27, 2006, NRC issued the final Design Certification Rule (DCR) for the 
AP1000 design in the Federal Register (71 FR 4464). Applicants or licensees intending to 
construct and operate a plant based on the AP1000 design may do so by referencing its 
DCR, as set forth in Appendix D to Title 10, Part 52, of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D). 
Among the other information, the AP1000 DCD specifies all the tests which have to be 
completed before the plant can start operation. Most of these tests are the normal 
commissioning tests which will be performed for all the AP1000 plants. Anyway, since 
AP1000 has some nuclear safety related features which are first of a kind, it is a 
requirement of the licensing process to demonstrate, on the first three built plants, that such 
systems perform as expected.  
In particular in the DCD it is clearly stated that, for the first three plants, two additional 
CMTs tests must be performed in order to verify their ability to work effectively in water 
recirculation mode, transit to draindown mode and finally to drain. Furthermore, in the 
DCD it is clearly stated that, for the first three plants only, the ADS must be tested by 
blowing-down the reactor coolant system. 
The first part of this PhD activity is related to these three tests: 
1) CMTs hot recirculation test 
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2) CMTs draindown test 
3) ADS test 
As said above it is a licensing requirement to perform these tests. They will be performed 
without any nuclear fuel in the reactor pressure vessel: in fact successful performance of 
these tests is required to be allowed to load the nuclear fuel thus starting power operation.  
Since these tests are required in the AP1000 licensing process and will be performed on the 
real plant, it is essential to develop suitable test procedures and perform accurate pre-tests 
calculations in order to make sure that the tests will be successfully performed without 
needing further runs and limiting the thermal and mechanical stresses to the plant. 
The first part of this PhD activity has been focused on the design of the procedures for the 
selected tests and on the performance of detailed pre-test calculations. The activity has 
been performed in collaboration with Ansaldo Nucleare and Westinghouse Electric 
Company personnel.  
In order to perform the pre-tests calculations, the Relap5 computer code (Information 
Systems Laboratories Inc., 2002.) has been used and a detailed AP1000 model has been 
developed. The developed model is described in detail in section 3, while section 4 
describes the pre-operational tests procedure and pre-tests calculations results.   
Summarizing, it should be noted that the AP1000 is the first commercially available 
nuclear power plant whose nuclear safety is guaranteed by passive safety systems. AP1000 
licensing process requires peculiar pre-operational tests of these systems on the first three 
built nuclear power plants. The first part of this PhD has given a contribution to this 
process since tests procedures and pre-tests calculations for three selected tests have been 
designed and performed.  
 
 
1.3. AP1000 Active Defense in Depth Systems 
As reported above, the over-arching design principle of the AP1000 plant with respect to 
nuclear safety is that all the safety features are passive. They use natural driving forces 
such as gravity and natural convection and the plant is capable to mitigate all the DBAs 
with neither AC power source nor operator actions (Westinghouse, 2010) (or very limited 
actions in some operational configurations to ensure adequate spent fuel pool cooling): in 
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particular, the nuclear safety of the AP1000 plant in case of a DBA is by no means affected 
by the coincidence of a loss of offsite power or station black-out event. 
Looking back to Figure 1, it can be seen that this is a different philosophy in comparison to 
what occurs for other generation III+ systems like, for example, the EPR (Bonhomme, 
1999). In this reactor, the nuclear safety is guaranteed essentially by active systems: in 
particular, for core cooling, four trains of essentially active safety systems are employed. 
These trains are identical to each other and physically separated in order to prevent 
common causes of failure. 
It seems that relying on passive systems or active ones are rather alternative choices, but, 
in this thesis it is highlighted how passive and active systems could be employed together 
with tangible benefits for the nuclear power plant. Actually this is not drastically new: in 
fact it can be easily noted that, even in the first generation of nuclear systems, a certain mix 
between active and passive safety features has always existed and it is retained also in the 
active-systems-safety-based generation III+ reactors, EPR included. In all the pressurized 
water reactors (from generation I to generation III+) the active safety systems employed 
for core cooling, like for example the High Pressure Injection System (HPIS) and Low 
Pressure Injection System (LPIS), have always co-performed together with passive 
systems like for example the accumulators (for core cooling) and the gravity driven control 
rods (for reactor shut down). The difference is that if from one side some generation III+ 
designs, like the EPR, have maintained the traditional active (and passive) safety features, 
some others, like the AP1000, employ only passive features to manage the nuclear safety 
of the reactor.  
In fact we should distinguish the licensing strategy of a plant from the practical accident 
management. The nuclear safety authority dictates that some dedicated safety systems, be 
them active or passive, have to be employed in order to protect the plant against selected 
design basis accidents. What it is important to note is that, in the licensing process of the 
plant, the safety authority requires the licensee to demonstrate the safety of the plant 
relying only on those features clearly identified as “safety related” and which have been 
designed specifically for that purpose. All the other systems, even if they could be 
available following an accident, are assumed to fail and do not give any contribution to the 
accident resolution. For the AP1000 this means that Westinghouse, in the DCD chapter 15 
safety analyses (Westinghouse, 2002), has demonstrated the safety of the plant assuming 
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the failure of all the active systems, relying only on the passive ones, which are the only 
systems specifically designed as safety related. All this, as said, holds for the licensing 
process of the plant.  
When coming to the practical accident management procedures design, the whole spectrum 
of possibly available systems, being them passive or active, safety related or not-safety 
related, should be investigated in order to evaluate the possible benefits which could come 
suitably combining different systems operation. At the same time it should also be 
demonstrated that failure of the not-safety related systems during the accident, hence once 
they have come into operation, does not raise any safety concern.   
For the AP1000 design, when AC power is available, the AP1000 passive systems can be 
supplemented with simple, active systems, so called “Defense in Depth (DiD)” systems. 
These active DiD systems use reliable and redundant active equipment, supported by the 
use of DiD standby diesels to facilitate their functions when offsite AC power is not 
available. These systems, even if not required for the safe response of the plant to a DBA, 
are designed to minimize the demand on passive systems for the most frequent (intact 
loop) transients, so as to provide a faster plant recovery.  
In this thesis, and in particular in the second part of the PhD work, the possibility to 
employ DiD systems also for more un-frequent accidents, and hence to achieve a 
cooperation or mixing between active and passive features in order to increase the benefits 
for the plant, has been investigated. Two AP1000 DBAs, an ADS inadvertent actuation and 
a 1” SBLOCA occurring during normal power operation have been considered to 
investigate the mitigation capability of a DiD system, and thus illustrate the multiple lines 
of defense offered in the AP1000 design also for infrequent faults such as LOCAs. 
The DBA safety analyses of these accidents postulate the failure of all the DiD systems 
and the accident is mitigated only by the passive systems: in particular for a LOCA, all 
four stages of the ADS actuate to allow water injection from the IRWST (section 1.1). To 
provide an additional line of defense, the Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS), 
an active DiD system, could be used by the operator if AC power is available to 
successfully mitigate the event without ADS stage 4 actuation and IRWST water injection.   
In particular, in this work, the two selected DBAs have been simulated postulating the 
availability of the RNS to verify if the RNS can actually avoid the requirement on ADS 
stage 4 and IRWST water injection.  
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It should be noted that, as explained in section 1.1, the first three ADS stages discharge in 
the IRWST with a limited direct impact to the containment. ADS stage 4, instead, 
discharges directly in the containment atmosphere with a more relevant direct impact to the 
containment. Avoiding stage 4 opening limits the direct impact of the selected accidents to 
the containment and allows a faster plant recovery. 
For the 1” SBLOCA, during the SPES2 experimental campaign, i.e. for the AP600, a test 
was run in which the RNS was kept active and avoided ADS stage 4 actuation, as reported 
in Bacchiani et al. (1995). In the present work such a demonstration is given for the 
AP1000 and, moreover, the effectiveness of the RNS is demonstrated for another accident, 
an inadvertent actuation of the ADS, which was not considered in the SPES2 experimental 
campaign and for which the benefit in using the RNS is actually bigger. Furthermore, in 
the present work it has also been demonstrated how failure of the RNS during the two 
selected accidents, once it has come into operation, does not raise any safety concern since 
passive safety systems remain available and can enter in operation. 
Section 5 details what briefly introduced above: in particular the physics by which RNS 
can avoid ADS stage 4 actuation is described in section 5.1, while sections 5.2 and 5.3 
describe accidents analyses results. 
In the next section, a brief description of the AP600 and AP1000 test program performed 
by Westinghouse Electric Company during the Design Certification of the two plants is 
reported (NUREG-1512 and NUREG-1793). 
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2. AP600 and AP1000 test program summary 
For the AP600 design certification, Westinghouse developed a design certification test 
program utilizing both separate-effects and integral-systems facilities to investigate the 
behavior of the AP600 passive safety systems and to develop a database for the validation 
of the computer codes used to perform the transient and accident analyses. The test 
programs can be broadly characterized as programs relating to reactor systems, to 
containment systems and to components testing. The test program to investigate the 
behavior of the passive core cooling systems include (1) the separate-effects tests on the 
PRHR-HX, ADS, and CMT and (2) the integral system tests performed at the Advanced 
Plant Experiment (APEX) facility and at the Simulatore per Esperienze di Sicurezza 
(SPES) facility. Furthermore, NRC performed independent additional and confirmatory 
tests on the Rig of Safety Assessment (ROSA) / Large Scale Test Facility (LSTF) in 
collaboration with the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (some details can be found 
in NUREG-1512 and Kukita et al. 1996).  
Tests performed for AP600 led to the qualification of the safety analyses codes to predict 
AP600 peculiar phenomena and, hence, to the AP600 Design Certification.  
During AP1000 Design Certification Process, NRC evaluated the adequacy of each of the 
AP600 test program for the AP1000 design, and concluded that additional test data were 
needed to address liquid entrainment in the upper plenum, hot-legs and ADS stage 4 
piping. As a result, Westinghouse added the APEX-1000 integral test program to the 
AP1000 test program. 
For completeness, in this section a summary of the AP600 and AP1000 test program 
developed by Westinghouse Electric Company, according to the US-NRC AP1000 Final 
Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-1793), is reported. The discussion is limited to the 
Integral Test Facilities and to the CMTs and ADS separate effect tests facilities, since the 
first part of this PhD work is focused on the pre-operational tests related to these systems.     
 
2.1. Core Make-up Tank test program 
The CMT test program was a separate-effects test program developed to characterize the 
CMT over the range of Thermal-Hydraulic (T-H, pressure, temperature, flow) conditions 
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in the AP600. Important phenomena studied included thermal stratification in the CMT 
and the effects of recirculation, draining, and plant depressurization on CMT behavior. 
Tests were performed at the facility located at the Westinghouse Waltz Mill site in 
Pennsylvania (USA). The test facility was approximately 3.3 m (10 ft) in height and 0.49 
m (1.6 ft) in diameter. Compared to the actual AP600 and AP1000 CMT, the facility was 
one-half of the height, and 1/7.77 and 1/8.69, respectively, of the diameters of the AP600 
and AP1000 designs. The reactor vessel was simulated by a steam/water reservoir (SWR). 
The CMT test component was connected to the SWR by a pipe simulating the cold-
leg/CMT pressure balance line, which came directly off the SWR, and by a drain line, 
simulating the DVI line. The RCS cold-leg was not represented in this facility. The CMT 
test facility was capable of operating up to approximately 17.2 MPaa (2500 psia) and 364 
°C (688 °F). Data acquisition was accomplished using a Personal Computer (PC)-based 
Data Acquisition System (PC-DAS). The facility was equipped with thermocouples, 
including those to obtain detailed spatial measurements of CMT fluid and wall 
temperatures, pressure transducers, including differential pressure transducers to measure 
CMT level, and flowmeters.  
The CMT test program began with cold preoperational tests in May 1993. The program 
proceeded though several series of tests. The “100” series investigated condensation of 
steam on the CMT walls, with and without the effects of noncondensable gases. The “300” 
series looked at mixing, condensation behavior, and CMT draining when steam was 
injected into cold water, such as might occur during a large SBLOCA or LBLOCA (i.e., no 
recirculation to heat the CMT water). The “400” test series was similar to the “300" series, 
but the system was depressurized gradually during the tests to assess the effect of changing 
pressure on the draining behavior. The final “500” series of tests included a period of 
recirculation between the SWR and the CMT to establish a desired temperature profile in 
the CMT. After the recirculation period, the SWR water level was reduced to allow steam 
to flow to the CMT, and the CMT was depressurized and drained. This series most closely 
represented conditions in the CMT expected during non-LOCA transients (CMT 
recirculation) and most SBLOCAs (recirculation, followed by draindown and 
depressurization).  
The test program was completed in September 1994. WCAP-14217, “Core Makeup Tank 
Test Data Report”, and WCAP-14215, “AP600 Core Makeup Tank Test analysis”, 
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respectively, provided the CMT test program final data report and test analysis report. The 
scaling of the CMT tests for the AP600 design was documented in WCAP-13963, Revision 
1, “Scaling Logic for the Core Makeup Tank Test”. In topical report WCAP-15613, 
“AP1000 PIRT and Scaling Assessment Report”, Westinghouse provided its evaluation to 
justify that the AP600 CMT test program is applicable to the AP1000 design.  
NRC evaluated the CMT test program during the AP600 design certification review.  The 
commission determined that the final design of the test facility provided an adequate 
representation of the key features of the RCS and connecting piping that would affect CMT 
performance, such as the relative elevations of the steam-water reservoir (representing the 
reactor vessel) and the tested component (representing the CMT) and the resistances of the 
pressure balance line and CMT drain line.  
The commission reviewed the final test matrix, and determined that the testing program 
would permit acquisition of data over most of the operating range of the CMT in the 
AP600, with respect to temperature, pressure, and flow, and would address the “important” 
phenomena, as determined from the AP600 Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table 
(PIRT).  
The design and operation of the facility did not permit acquisition of data at very low 
pressures. However, this was judged to be acceptable, since both of the integral test 
facilities (see below) would operate down to those pressures and would provide additional 
data for code validation in that range.  
The NRC overall assessment of the CMT test program was that the data acquired during 
the test program and verified to meet the Westinghouse acceptance criteria are valid and 
applicable for use to validate computer models for the AP600.  
For what the AP1000 is concerned, NRC, after review of WCAP-15613, “AP1000 PIRT 
and Scaling Assessment Report”, considered CMT tests to be acceptable for the AP1000 
design as they were for the AP600 design. 
 
2.2. Automatic Depressurization System test program 
The ADS test program consisted of separate-effects tests performed at the facility called 
“VAPORE”, located at the Casaccia (Rome. Italy) Research Center (see Figure 11). It has 
a full-size configuration of the AP600/AP1000 ADS stages 1, 2, and 3 (ADS-1/2/3) piping 
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network, exhaust pipe, and sparger. The tests consisted of two phases with somewhat 
different objectives. Phase A tests were performed for the ADS-1/2/3 with steam flow 
through a sparger into a larger water-filled tank to investigate the capacity of the ADS 
sparger in the IRWST and determine the dynamic effects on the IRWST structure. 
Parameters of interest were sparger flow and pressure drop, tank T-H and structural 
response, including condensation, thermal stratification, and condensation-induced 
pressure loads on the tank walls.  
The second part, Phase B1, was a test of the T-H behavior of the ADS piping network that 
extends from the pressurizer into the IRWST. The test objective was focused only on the 
T-H behavior of the ADS valves, piping, and sparger. The main parameter of interest was 
the flow from the pressurizer to the simulated IRWST with various combinations of ADS 
stages open, including choking at various locations through the valve/piping/sparger 
network. The major T-H variable for these tests was the quality of the fluid entering the 
ADS network. Steam-only blowdowns were performed using a discharge line from the top 
of the steam-water supply tank. This discharge line contained a separator to remove 
entrained liquid. A discharge line was also provided from the bottom of the supply tank to 
obtain two-phase mixtures through the ADS network. A control valve in the bottom 
discharge line from the supply tank was adjusted to allow the flow to be varied from 
saturated liquid conditions to two-phase flow over a range of qualities. In addition, a series 
of tests was performed with cold water flowing through the valve/piping network to aid in 
determining the hydraulic characteristics of the valve/piping/sparger system under single-
phase, non-choked conditions.  
For Phase A, the actual test component was only the sparger, installed in the quench tank. 
Saturated steam was supplied to the sparger from a large supply tank. 
The test facility was modified extensively for Phase B1. The supply tank, the large water 
quench tank, and the sparger were retained, and a piping network representing one 
complete group of ADS valves (stages 1, 2, and 3, with two valves in series per stage) was 
added. One ADS valve in each stage was represented by an actual valve. The other valve in 
each stage was represented by a spool piece containing an orifice to simulate the throat 
area and loss characteristics of various potential valve designs. Exhaust piping led from the 
ADS piping network to the same quench tank and sparger assembly used in Phase A. The 
ADS piping, the valves and simulated valves, and the sparger were full-size components, 
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and could operate up to full AP600/AP1000 pressure. The facility was equipped with 
flowmeters, pressure transducers and thermocouples. Instrumentation to measure pressure 
loads and tank response in the IRWST were included. Data acquisition was accomplished 
using a computer-controlled PC-DAS.  
The ADS test program is described in WCAP-13342 (“AP600 Automatic Depressurization 
System Test”) and the Phase A facility configuration is described in WCAP-14149 
(“VAPORE Facility Description Report, AP600 Automatic Depressurization System Phase 
A Test”). The Phase B1 facility is described WCAP-14303, “Facility Description Report 
AP600 ADS Phase B1 Tests”. Because the VAPORE facility incorporated full-scale 
components, a formal scaling report was not necessary for this test program.  
The Phase A program and selected test data are described in WCAP-13891 (“AP600 
Automatic Depressurization System Phase A Test Data Report”). 
Phase B1 of the ADS test program was documented in the final data report WCAP-14234, 
“LOFTRAN & LOFTTR2 AP600 Code Applicability Document”, and the test analysis 
was documented in the final analysis report WCAP-14305, Revision 3, “AP600 Test 
Program ADS Phase B1 Test Analysis Report”.  
Westinghouse did not perform ADS-4 separate-effects testing for the AP600 design since 
ADS-4 was treated/sized conservatively and tested as part of the integral effects tests, and 
Westinghouse took the same approach for the AP1000 standard plant design. 
NRC evaluated the ADS test program during the AP600 design certification review. The 
agency original review of the ADS test program in the VAPORE facility focused primarily 
on the Phase B1 facility design, instrumentation, and test matrix. Scaling was not a 
significant issue because of the full-size configuration of the ADS piping network, exhaust 
pipe, and sparger.  
NRC concluded that the design certification test program provided adequate coverage of T-
H conditions and addressed the “important” phenomena related to ADS performance 
identified in the AP600 PIRT and, therefore, was acceptable. The only issue raised related 
to the fact that, for each of the three ADS stages simulated, the downstream valve was not 
actually a valve but a spool piece containing an orifice to simulate the throat area and loss 
characteristics of various potential valve designs. Westinghouse response was to perform a 
final phase, so-called B2, in which actual ADS control valves were used. NRC found tests 
results acceptable and declared the issue “closed”.   
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The ADS-1/2/3 system for the AP1000 standard plant design is identical to that of the 
AP600 design. During the RCS blowdown, the flow through the ADS-1/2/3 is expected to 
be choked. Simulations have revealed that upstream pressures in the AP1000 are very 
similar to those in the AP600 design, as well as T-H conditions affecting ADS-1/2/3 
performance. Consequently, tests executed to investigate ADS-1/2/3 performance for the 
AP600 design, which included a wide range of actuation pressures and flow qualities, were 
considered appropriate to represent conditions in the AP1000 standard plant design. 
Therefore, NRC concluded that the ADS test program for the AP600 design also applies to 
the AP1000 design.  
 
 
Figure 11: VAPORE test facility 
 
 
31 
 
2.3. Advanced Plant Experiment (APEX-600) Test Program 
The APEX-600 test program was a major integral test program conducted by 
Westinghouse for the AP600 design certification. Tests were performed at a facility 
located on the Oregon State University (OSU) campus in Corvallis, Oregon (USA) (see 
Figure 12 and Figure 13). The objective of the test program was to obtain integral-systems 
data for the validation of computer codes used for AP600 safety analyses. Particular 
emphasis was placed on low-pressure and long-term cooling behavior in design-basis 
SBLOCAs. APEX-600 was a low-pressure, one-quarter-height representation of the 
AP600 design, including the RCS and related components and all safety systems in direct 
communication with the primary system. Although containment cooling systems were not 
represented, the containment sump was simulated by two tanks. The “primary” sump tank 
simulated containment sump volumes from which fluid could be recirculated back to the 
RCS during the long-term cooling phase of a LOCA, and was connected to DVI lines. The 
“secondary” sump tank simulated volumes in the AP600 containment from which fluid 
could not be recirculated back to the RCS; fluid that entered the secondary sump was 
unrecoverable for long-term cooling, as would be the case in the AP600 plant. The volume 
scale of the facility was 1/192 while the reactor power, flow areas, and flow rates were 
designed to have, respectively, the ratios of 1/96, 1/48, and 1/96. This means that APEX 
was designed to have a response twice as fast as in AP600. The layout of the facility was 
similar to the AP600 design, with two cold-legs and one hot-leg per loop and vertically 
mounted reactor coolant pumps with no loop seals. In addition to the safety injection 
systems (CMTs, accumulators, and IRWST) and the four-stage ADS, the PRHR-HX was 
simulated by a scaled bundle in the IRWST. The facility was instrumented with over 700 
thermocouples, flowmeters, pressure transducers, and void detectors.  
WCAP-14124 (“AP600 Low Pressure Integral Systems Test at Oregon State University — 
Facility Description Report”) and WCAP-13234, Revision 1 (“Long-Term Cooling Test”), 
respectively, documented the facility design and test program specifications. An extensive 
scaling analysis was performed for the APEX-600 facility and documented in WCAP-
14270, Revision 1 (“Low Pressure Systems Test Facility Scaling Report”, August 1997). 
Tests were performed in 1994. Most of the test runs in the APEX-600 facility simulated 
design basis accidents (DBAs) for the AP600, primarily SBLOCAs of various sizes and at 
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different locations in the RCS. All of the tests included an extended period after the loop 
was fully depressurized to investigate integral system T-H behavior during injection from 
the IRWST, transition from IRWST to sump injection, and long-term recirculatory cooling 
from the simulated sump. The two major variables affecting system behavior were break 
size and location. Break size varied from (scaled) 12.7 mm (0.5 in.) to approximately 203 
mm (8 in.). Break locations tested included the cold-leg, hot-leg, CMT pressure balance 
line, and DVI line.  
NRC evaluated the OSU/APEX-600 test facility during the AP600 design certification 
review. In addition to the Westinghouse design certification testing, the NRC conducted a 
confirmatory testing program in the OSU/APEX-600 facility. Insights from those 
confirmatory tests that bear upon integral system behavior in general, and facility response 
in particular, had been factored into the test program review.  
As originally conceived, the facility was to be a low-pressure [approximately 345 kPaa (50 
psia)] loop to investigate the last part of the plant depressurization and long-term cooling 
behavior in SBLOCA events. Westinghouse and OSU gradually changed the design to 
increase the maximum pressure to about 2.7 MPaa (400 psia), which improved scaling and 
allowed a wider range of test conditions to be explored.  
NRC determined that the final design was acceptable. Essentially, the entire primary 
system was represented, including all safety-related systems, in a geometry very similar to 
the actual plant design. While the containment itself was not simulated, the two sump tanks 
provided a scaled representation of the volumes into which flow from the break and ADS-4 
discharge, and condensate from the PCS would drain and recirculate to the RCS. The 
facility was extensively instrumented to provide temperature, pressure, flow, and void 
fraction data throughout the system.  
The test matrix focused on SBLOCAs because (1) LOCAs are the only events to cause the 
ADS to actuate and to progress to long-term cooling within the design basis; and (2) 
LBLOCA response in the AP600 was calculated to be similar in many ways to 
conventional designs, and Westinghouse asserted that important phenomena in LBLOCAs 
related to long-term cooling would be similar to SBLOCA behavior. NRC agreed with the 
Westinghouse approach, found this reasoning acceptable, and determined that the 
OSU/APEX-600 test matrix provided adequate coverage of break size and location to 
address important system-related phenomena identified in the AP600 PIRT.  
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WCAP-14252, “AP600 Low-Pressure Integral System Test at Oregon State University 
Final Data Report”, and WCAP-14292, Revision 1, “AP600 Low-Pressure Integral System 
Test at Oregon State University Test Analysis Report”, respectively, described the test data 
and test analyses for the OSU/APEX-600 test program, while WCAP-14272, Revision 2, 
described the Westinghouse scaling assessment of the OSU/APEX-600 facility.  
NRC reviewed the submitted reports and, even if several requests for additional 
information were raised (mainly related to potential scaling distortions and to some 
oscillations occurring during the tests), the Westinghouse response was judged acceptable 
and the issues considered resolved.  
In addition the NRC performed a confirmatory test program which provided additional 
data from the OSU/APEX-600 test facility and contributed to the commission 
understanding of the plant integral system behavior in design-basis events. 
For the AP1000 design certification, NRC also evaluated the applicability of the APEX-
600 test program to the AP1000 design. The commission determined that the APEX-600 
facility is generally appropriately scaled for the AP1000 design, and is acceptable for the 
AP1000 code validation for the periods of the IRWST injection/drain phase and the 
IRWST/sump injection phase of a transient. However, NRC also found that the APEX-600 
test data were inadequate for use in the AP1000 code validation in the areas of liquid 
entrainment in the upper plenum , hot-legs and ADS4 piping (and core liquid level swell), 
and that additional test data were needed for the AP1000. As a result, Westinghouse added 
the APEX-1000 integral test program. 
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Figure 12: APEX test facility – PRZ and SG dome view 
 
 
Figure 13: APEX test facility – Hot leg, cold legs and RPV 
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2.4. OSU APEX-1000 Test Program 
The OSU APEX-600 integral system test facility was designed and used to assess the 
passive safety systems for the AP600 design. As described above, NRC found that the 
APEX-600 test data were inadequate for use in the AP1000 code validation in the areas of 
liquid entrainment in the upper plenum, hot-legs, and ADS-4 piping (and core level swell), 
and that additional test data were needed for the AP1000. To address performance specific 
to the AP1000 design, the APEX-600 facility underwent significant modifications in 2002 
to more accurately represent the AP1000 design and was renamed the APEX-1000 Test 
Facility. Like APEX-600, the APEX-1000 is a low-pressure, 1/4-height representation of 
the AP1000 design. Westinghouse submitted two topical reports describing the APEX-
1000 facility and the basis for its scaling. The details of the APEX-1000 test facility, 
including the modifications from the original OSU APEX facility, are described in the 
report OSU-APEX-03002, “OSU APEX-1000 Test Facility Description Report”. Topical 
report OSU-APEX-03001, “Scaling Assessment for the Design of the OSU APEX-1000 
Test Facility”, describes the scaling analysis performed to guide the OSU APEX-1000 test 
facility modifications. The facility modifications include an increase in the maximum core 
power, a larger pressurizer and reduced surge line diameter, and larger CMTs. The ADS 
Stage 4 was replaced with appropriate sized valves and piping, and the line resistances 
between the CMT and vessel, and through the PRHR were likewise reduced consistent 
with the AP1000 design. Table 1 summarizes changes made to the APEX facility for 
AP1000. 
 
Table 1: AP600 to APEX1000 modifications 
COMPONENT Modifications to APEX-600 
Reactor Power 
 
Increase core power by 67 percent (to nearly 1 
MW). 
Pressurizer 
 
Increase pressurizer volume. 
Reduce pressurizer surge line diameter. 
SG Heat Transfer Area No change required for testing. 
RCP Flow No change required for testing. 
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CMTs 
 
Increase CMT volumes by 25 percent. 
Reduce line resistance by 64 percent. 
Accumulators No change required for testing. 
ADS Stages 1-3 No change required for testing. 
ADS Stage 4 
 
Increase ADS-4 flow area by 76 percent. 
Reduce line resistance to 28 percent of original. 
PRHR 
 
Increase PRHR flow capacity by 74 percent. 
No change in heat transfer area. 
Containment Increase sump curb height. 
 
Not all components in APEX were modified even though corresponding changes were 
made to the plant design from AP600 to AP1000. For example, the AP1000 steam 
generators, with 11477 m
2
 (123,538 ft
2
) of heat transfer area, are substantially larger than 
the AP600 steam generators, with 6984.5 m
2
 (75,180 ft
2
). No changes were made to the 
APEX steam generators, since the tube volume is small compared to the volume of the rest 
of the primary system and the generators are oversized for the decay power involved in 
testing. That is, the existing APEX steam generators have more heat transfer area than is 
necessary to remove decay heat. An increase in the pump capacity was not necessary 
because the pumps are tripped at the start of each transient, and their main contribution 
thereafter is their resistance, which was preserved. Therefore, it was neither important nor 
necessary to modify these components for AP1000 testing in either case. The upper core 
plate and upper plenum of APEX were redesigned in order to improve the modeling of 
upper plenum entrainment and core plate flooding, and to account for differences between 
the AP600 and AP1000 designs. In the AP1000, in order to accommodate the higher core 
power, twelve additional fuel assemblies were added to the AP600 core design. These 
assemblies were positioned at the outer edge of the core, with some of the new assemblies 
placed just below the two hot-leg nozzles. In the APEX-1000, additional holes were placed 
in the upper core plate to capture the localized jetting of steam flow at these locations. The 
upper core plate design utilized a hole pattern so that drainage from the upper plenum to 
the core was preserved. Since there were numerous changes made to APEX-600 in 
development of the APEX-AP1000 facility, scaling analyses were conducted by both 
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Westinghouse and the NRC to ensure that the appropriate modifications were made, and 
that the APEX-1000 facility was a reasonable representation of the full scale prototype. 
Special emphasis was placed on scaling upper plenum entrainment, since this had been 
identified as a non conservative distortion in the APEXAP600 facility for application to 
AP1000 design. Testing in the APEX-1000 facility began in 2003, with several integral 
experiments sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy to investigate performance of 
AP1000 passive safety systems at DBA conditions. The NRC also conducted confirmatory 
tests on T-H processes for which data from the APEX-600 series of tests were not 
adequate. The APEX-1000 integral test series performed for simulation of the DBAs 
includes simulations of (1) two tests of a double-ended guillotine break of the DVI line 
(DEDVI) with a single failure of one ADS-4 valve on the non-pressurizer side before and 
after modifications to the ADS-4 piping and valves, respectively, (2) a DEDVI break with 
failure of one ADS-4 valve on the pressurizer side, and (3) two tests of a 2-inch cold-leg 
break with a single failure of one ADS-4 valve at 2.65 MPaa (370 psig) and 0.96 MPaa (125 
psig), respectively. The test results are documented in test summary reports OSU-AP1000-
01, OSU-AP1000-02, OSU-AP1000-03, OSU-AP1000-04, and OSU-AP1000-05, 
respectively.  
NRC evaluated positively the experimental campaign performed at the APEX1000 facility, 
considering resolved the issues on the applicability of the APEX600 test program to the 
AP1000.    
 
2.5. SPES-2 High-Pressure, Full-Height Integral-Systems Test 
Program 
The SPES-2 test program was the second integral-system test program performed for 
design certification of the AP600. The objective of this test program was similar to that of 
the OSU APEX-600 program (i.e. acquisition of integral-system data for the validation of 
computer codes used to perform AP600 safety analyses). Unlike the APEX-600 facility, 
however, SPES-2 could operate at pressures and temperatures up to prototypic 
AP600/AP1000 values and was approximately full vertical scale. Because of this unique 
capability, tests in SPES-2 focused primarily on integral system behavior in the period 
from accident initiation (at prototypic pressure and temperature and scaled full power) to 
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the establishment of stable injection from the IRWST. The test matrix included a range of 
SBLOCAs from scaled 25 mm (1 in.) cold-leg breaks to double-ended guillotine breaks of 
a DVI line and a CMT balance line. In addition, non-LOCA transients were simulated in 
SPES-2, including single steam generator tube ruptures (SGTRs) and a main steamline 
break. Other parameters tested included interactions with non-safety-related systems (one 
1” cold-leg SBLOCA and one SGTR test) and inadvertent actuation of the ADS during an 
SGTR event. Tests were performed at the facility located at the Societa’ Informazioni 
Esperienze Termoidrauliche (SIET) laboratories in Piacenza, Italy, in 1994 (see Figure 14). 
SPES-2 was a full-height representation of the AP600 design. The volume scale was 
approximately 1/395. However, SPES was not designed from the beginning as an AP600 
test facility. Rather, SPES-2 was a modification of the existing SPES-1 facility, which 
represented a 1/427-volume-scale of a Westinghouse three-loop PWR. As a result, some 
distortions and atypicalities existed in SPES-2 compared to the AP600/AP1000 design. 
The most significant of these were as follows: 
 SPES-2 had only one pump per loop, rather than the two pumps per loop of the 
AP600 and AP1000, so that outlet flow from the pump had to be split between the 
two cold-legs; 
 SPES-2 had an external piped downcomer, rather than an annular downcomer. The 
design was modified, however, so that there was an annular section at the top of the 
simulated reactor vessel, which then fed into the piped downcomer below the 
elevation of the DVI lines; 
 SPES-2 had a much larger surface-area-to-volume ratio than the AP600. This 
caused distortions in two ways. In the initial stages of a transient, high heat losses 
occurred. This was compensated by increasing the rod bundle power during the 
period from accident initiation to the beginning of ADS blowdown. In the later 
stages of a transient, the effect was reversed, and excessive heat input to the system 
occurred from the structure. To relieve the excess steam resulting from this effect, 
the vent area of the simulated ADS-4 valves in SPES-2 was significantly larger 
than its nominal scaled (1/395) value, to achieve a depressurization rate calculated 
to be approximately the same as in the AP600 design. 
All AP600/AP1000 safety systems were represented, including CMTs, accumulators, 
IRWST injection, four-stage ADS, and the PRHR system, in which the PRHR-HX was 
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simulated by three C-tubes in the IRWST tank. Sump recirculation was not simulated in 
the SPES-2 loop. The facility contained over 300 measurement instruments, including 
thermocouples, flowmeters, pressure transducers, and void instrumentation. Data were 
collected using a computer-controlled PC-DAS. 
The SPES-2 test program was documented in several reports, including WCAP-13277 
(“Scaling, Design, and Verification of SPES-2, the Italian Experimental Facility Simulator 
of the AP600 Plant”); WCAP-13277, Revision 1 (“Scaling, Design, and Verification of 
SPES-2, the Italian Experimental Facility Simulator of the AP600 Plant; Scaling Update”); 
WCAP-14053 (“AP600 FHFP Integral Systems Test Specification”); and WCAP-14073 
(“SPES-2 Facility Description”). Cold preoperational testing in the SPES-2 facility began 
in May 1993; matrix testing began in February 1994 and was completed in November 
1994. The final data report and the test analysis report for the SPES-2 program are 
contained in WCAP-14309, Revision 1, “AP600 Design Certification Program SPES-2 
Tests Final Data Report”, and WCAP-14254, “AP600 SPES-2 Test Analysis Report”, 
respectively.  
NRC evaluated the Westinghouse SPES-2 test program during the AP600 design 
certification review. Early review of the SPES-2 program focused on test facility 
modifications (since SPES was an existing facility), instrumentation, scaling, and the test 
matrix. SPES-2 included several distortions that arose either as a result of its 1/395 scaling 
ratio to the AP600 plant (e.g., heat loss, metal heat addition) or the necessity of modifying 
an already-existing facility (e.g., external downcomer, one pump per loop). The impact of 
these distortions was reviewed. The major design distortions were found to be acceptable. 
In the case of the downcomer, the addition of an annular section to accommodate the cold-
legs and DVI lines was found to adequately characterize flow behavior within the context 
of the one-dimensional system representation provided by the SPES-2 facility. The single 
pump per loop, rather than the two pumps in the actual plant, was considered to be a 
relatively minor distortion, since the safety system response in the types of events 
simulated in SPES-2 included tripping the reactor coolant pumps early in the accident, 
coincident with CMT actuation. The resistance to natural circulation flow through the 
actual plant piping and two pumps was represented in SPES-2, and the elevation of the 
cold-legs with reference to the steam generators was maintained.  
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Because the SPES-2 facility was full-height and operated at full pressure and scaled full 
power conditions, the scaling analysis was a relatively simple comparison of the 
configuration (piping and key elevations), component flow areas, and pressure losses in 
SPES-2 to the plant design. Except for those distortions identified above, the facility 
compared well to the plant. Innovative designs were employed to minimize distortions 
where possible. For example, the SPES-2 CMTs were full-pressure and full-height, but 
were about 1/20 the diameter of the AP600 components. This can cause a distortion in the 
structural heat content, which could affect CMT draining behavior. To minimize the 
distortion, the SPES-2 CMTs were designed with thin walls. Since these tanks could not 
withstand differential pressures up to full RCS pressure, they were placed inside larger 
vessels that were pressurized with air to maintain acceptable stresses in the tank walls. As 
the loop (and CMTs) depressurized during a test, air was exhausted from the vessels to 
maintain acceptable structural conditions. NRC found the scaling approach and modified 
facility design acceptable.  
The commission reviewed the test matrix and determined that it covered an adequate range 
of SBLOCA sizes and locations; the simulation of the SGTR and main steamline break 
events was also found to be adequate. NRC also determined that the test program would 
address many “important” items related to integral system behavior as identified in the 
AP600 PIRT, especially at elevated system pressures and temperatures outside the range of 
conditions covered in the OSU/APEX-600 tests. All of the tests represented DBA 
scenarios (including a single active failure), with the exception of one SGTR test, and one 
SBLOCA test that included the use of (simulated) non-safety systems. 
The testing procedure for all SBLOCA tests was to consider the test as concluded when 
stable IRWST injection was established (i.e., there was no attempt to represent long-term 
cooling, as was the case in the OSU/APEX-600 tests). The only exception was the test with 
non-safety systems simulated: use of the (simulated) RNS system as a low-pressure 
injection system prevented the CMTs from draining to the ADS-4 level setpoint. For the 
non-LOCA tests (SGTRs and main steamline break), the criterion for test termination was 
for the system to be stabilized at elevated pressures, since, within the design basis, these 
events were not predicted to result in ADS actuation.  
The tests simulating design-basis SBLOCAs ended with the facility fully depressurized 
and with the core covered and cooled using IRWST injection. The SBLOCA test that 
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included use of non-safety systems ended with water injection using the RNS pumps 
allowing the system to stabilize at a slightly elevated pressure. For the non-LOCA 
transients, the system stabilized at elevated pressures with no ADS actuation: CMT 
injection in the recirculation mode was successful in adding coolant inventory without 
reducing CMT levels to the ADS-1 setpoint.  
No core heatup was observed during any of the tests. Oscillations were observed during 
several of the tests, and were especially persistent during the SGTR tests. However, the 
reactor vessel liquid levels were well above the top of the simulated core. Responding to 
the NRC requests, Westinghouse provided plausible explanations for the observed 
phenomena, relating them to density-wave oscillations that ceased when the steam 
generators drained. Since in a LOCA this would occur well before any possibility of 
uncovering the core, the behavior did not raise safety concerns. In the SGTR test, the steam 
generators did not drain for an extended period, causing the oscillations to persist. 
However, this did not affect the ability of the CMTs to recirculate and stabilize the system 
pressure and temperature without ADS actuation.  
Westinghouse response adequately resolved the NRC concerns. The primary issues to be 
addressed by the SPES-2 tests were related to integral systems behavior, especially at 
elevated pressures beyond those covered in the OSU/APEX-600 experiments. Examples of 
these issues were as follows: 
 system response and systems interactions in the early stages of DBAs, including 
transition from CMT recirculation to CMT draining, accumulator injection, and 
effects of early stages of depressurization; 
 for non-LOCA transients, ability of the system to come to a stable condition at 
elevated pressures. 
WCAP-14727, Revision 2, “AP600 Scaling and PIRT Closure Report”, addressed issues 
related to distortions from identified sources (e.g., excess power to compensate for heat 
losses) and “validation” of those aspects of the AP600 PIRT relevant to the SPES-2 tests. 
The major technical issue not related to distortions was the oscillatory behavior, which was 
acceptably resolved as discussed above.  
NRC concluded that the SPES-2 test program accomplished its objectives and that 
Westinghouse developed a database that addressed the raised issues. Also, as with the 
APEX-600 test program, insights gained from NRC-sponsored AP600 confirmatory testing 
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in both the ROSA facility and the OSU/APEX-600 facility were considered in the SPES-2 
evaluation. Therefore, on the basis of its review of the test program reports and the 
Westinghouse responses to the commission’s requests for additional information (RAIs), 
the NRC determined that the SPES-2 testing program was acceptable. 
For the AP1000 certification, NRC evaluated the applicability of the SPES-2 test program 
to the AP1000 design, concluding that the program is applicable also to the AP1000 design 
for small-break LOCAs in the initial stages of the accident, up to the high pressure phase 
of ADS-4 blowdown. 
 
 
Figure 14: SPES2 test facility – RPV and main loops 
 
The above mentioned test programs, as specified, allowed Westinghouse to investigate the 
main phenomena occurring in the passive features of the AP600/AP1000 and also to 
qualify the codes used for safety analyses. For further details on the AP600 and AP1000 
test program, please refer to the AP600 and AP1000 Final Safety Evaluation Reports 
(NUREG-1512 and NUREG-1793). 
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Nevertheless, as outlined above (section 1.2.4), the AP1000 licensing process requires the 
new features to be tested on the first three built nuclear power plants. In this work, pre-
operational tests procedures have been developed and pre-tests calculations have been 
performed by means the of the Relap5 computer code for three selected tests: CMTs hot 
recirculation test, CMTs draindown test and ADS test. 
Next section details the developed AP1000 Relap5 model.     
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3. AP1000 Relap5 Input Model Description 
In order to perform the pre-tests and Design Basis Accidents simulations, a fully detailed 
AP1000 Relap5 model has been developed. The model scheme is reported in Figure 15, 
while a summary description of the input can be found in Table 2
2
. 
It should be noted that an AP1000 input was already available in Ansaldo Nucleare S.p.A. 
since 2001 but, for this work, the input has been completely revised and completed 
according to the most recent available documentation.  
The design parameters needed for model development have been taken from the AP1000 
Design Control Document (Westinghouse Electric Company, 2010) and from other 
classified documents (Westinghouse Electric Company and Ansaldo Nucleare 
Documents). 
For model development, the Relap5 modeling guidelines reported in the code manual 
(Information Systems Laboratories, Inc. 2002) have been strictly followed. Furthermore an 
extensive code validation process was carried out in Ansaldo Nucleare S.p.A. (Alemberti 
et al., 1994 and 1995, Bacchiani et al., 1995): the developed model is consistent (noding 
size, transition from one noding size to another, physical models activation, etc.) with the 
performed in-house validation process.    
The following sub-sections provide a description of the systems which have been modeled 
and the status of the AP1000 modeling as developed during this work. Further 
modifications needed to represent the actual configuration of the plant for pre-operational 
tests are described in section 4.1  
 
3.1. Reactor Pressure Vessel 
All internal components of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) are considered in the 
nodalization and all major bypass paths inside the vessel are simulated, resulting in a close 
representation of the global bypass flow. 
                                                          
2
 In the following of the document, for what the “components” accumulators, CMTs, DVI lines, etc. is 
concerned, “component 1” and “component A” refers to the same “component”, as well as “component 2” 
and “component B”. As an example: DVI-1 or DVI-A refers to the same DVI line, the one which connects to 
pipe 101.   
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Figure 16 shows the considered vessel sub-regions, while Figure 17 shows the noding 
scheme. The following regions are modeled: lower plenum, downcomer, core and core 
bypass, upper plenum, upper and lower guide tubes, upper head. They have all been 
simulated by means of pipe or branch components. In particular, for what the core is 
concerned, it has to be noted that the core is simulated by means of two different 
components: one representing the hot channel and the other representing the remaining 
portion of the core. Furthermore the bypass flow between the core and the barrel and the 
flow through the control rods housing within the fuel assemblies are taken into account.  
Heat structures are used to simulate the core and the main RPV internals and RPV walls: 
vessel upper head, vessel wall cylindrical portion, lower head, lower head structures, lower 
support plate, core barrel, upper core plate, upper plenum structures (support columns), 
lower guide tubes, upper guide tubes, upper support plate, upper head structures. 
For what the core is concerned, it has to be noted that the fuel bundle is subdivided into 4 
heat structures, representing respectively the middle channel structure simulating the 
power generated by 74 fuel elements, the peripheral channel structure consisting of 82 fuel 
elements, the hot channel structure consisting of 263 fuel rods and the hot rod. Furthermore 
the power axial profile is simulated together with the main reactivity feedbacks (simulated 
by means of a combination of Relap5 control variables and general tables): boron 
reactivity feedback, Doppler reactivity feedback and moderator density reactivity 
feedback.
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Figure 15: AP1000 Relap5 input model scheme
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Table 2: AP1000 Relap5 input model summary 
General zone Name Number Type 
Pressure vessel 
Downcomer 
91, 92 annulus 
88, 89 branch 
101, 102 annulus 
Lower plenum 110 branch 
Core region 114, 115 pipe 
Core bypass 116, 118 branch 
Upper plenum 120, 130, 131 branch 
Upper head 140, 150, 160 branch 
Guide tubes 125, 135, 155 branch 
Loop 1 
Hot leg 205, 207 branch 
SG U-tubes and plena 225 pipe 
Pump 240, 270 pump 
Cold leg 
245, 242 
275, 272 
branch 
branch 
250, 280 snglvol 
Loop 2 
Hot leg 305, 307 branch 
SG U-tubes and plena 325 pipe 
Pump 340, 370 pump 
Cold leg 
345, 342 
375, 372 
branch 
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Table 2: AP1000 Relap5 input model summary 
General zone Name Number Type 
350, 380 snglvol 
DVI Lines 
DVI 1 
864 pipe 
867 sngljun 
DVI 2 
884 pipe 
887 sngljun 
Pressurizer 
Surge line 443 pipe 
PRZ nozzle 442 sngljun 
PRZ vessel 
441 pipe 
440 branch 
PRZ valve 33 trpvlv 
PRZ pres cntrl 34 tmdpvol 
PRZ lev cntrl 941 tmdpjun 
PRZ lev cntrl 940 tmdpvol 
PRZ safety valves 45, 47 mtrvlv 
PRZ safety valves 
discharge 
2, 3 tmdpvol 
Spray line connections 411/412, 413/414, 415 branch 
Spray line valves 421/422 srvvlv 
Auxiliary Spray line 948 branch 
Auxiliary Spray valves 949 mtrvlv 
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Table 2: AP1000 Relap5 input model summary 
General zone Name Number Type 
Secondary side  
(loop 1) 
 
Feedwater junction 501, 511 tmdpjun 
Feedwater junction 502, 512 tmdpvol 
FWS junction (1 pump) 508 tmdpjun 
FWS FW tank 509 tmdpvol 
FWS junction (2 pump) 518 tmdpjun 
FWS FW tank 519 tmdpvol 
SG level cntrl 503, 505 tmdpjun 
SG level cntrl 504, 506 tmdpvol 
Downcomer 
510 branch 
520 pipe 
521 sngljun 
Riser 530 pipe 
Separator 550 separatr 
Dome 
570 pipe 
575 sngljun 
Steam line 581, 584 pipe 
MSIV 583 mtrlvlv 
Safety valves (SRV) 591, 593, 595 mtrlvlv 
PORV 597, 598 mtrvlv 
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Table 2: AP1000 Relap5 input model summary 
General zone Name Number Type 
Secondary side  
(loop 2) 
Feedwater junction 601, 611 tmdpjun 
Feedwater junction 602, 612 tmdpvol 
FWS junction (1 pump) 608 tmdpjun 
FWS FW tank 609 tmdpvol 
FWS junction (2 pump) 618 tmdpjun 
FWS FW tank 619 tmdpvol 
SG level cntrl 603, 605 tmdpjun 
SG level cntrl 604, 606 tmdpvol 
Downcomer 
610 branch 
620 pipe 
621 sngljun 
Riser 630 pipe 
Separator 650 separatr 
Dome 
670 pipe 
675 sngljun 
Steam line 681, 684 pipe 
MSIV 683 mtrlvlv 
Safety valves (SRV) 691, 693, 695 mtrlvlv 
PORV 697, 698 mtrvlv 
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Table 2: AP1000 Relap5 input model summary 
General zone Name Number Type 
CMT 1 
CMT junction 856 sngljun 
CMT balance line 
857 pipe 
858 pipe 
CMT valve 855 trpvlv 
CMT tank 860 pipe 
CMT exit valve 861 mtrvlv 
CMT surge line 862 pipe 
CMT isolation valve 863 chkvlv 
DVI1 connection 866 branch 
CMT 2 
CMT junction 876 sngljun 
CMT balance line 
877 pipe 
878 pipe 
CMT valve 875 trpvlv 
CMT tank 880 pipe 
CMT exit valve 881 mtrvlv 
CMT surge line 882 pipe 
CMT isolation valve 863 chkvlv 
DVI2 connection 886 branch 
ACCUMULATOR 1 ACC tank 865 accum 
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Table 2: AP1000 Relap5 input model summary 
General zone Name Number Type 
ACCUMULATOR 2 ACC tank 885 accum 
ADS 1/2 (I, II, III 
stages) 
ADS from PRZ to 
isolation valves 
445/545, 446/450 branch 
ADS isolation valves 
348/349, 358/359, 
368/369 
mtrvlv 
ADS from isolation 
valves to control valves 
444/544, 447/547, 
451/551 
pipe 
ADS control valves 
448/449, 458/459, 
468/469 
mtrvlv 
ADS outlet line 480/484 pipe 
ADS spargers 481/485 branch 
ADS 1 (IV stage) 
From PRHR inlet line to 
ADS squib valves 
472/474 branch 
ADS squib valves 477/478 mtrvlv 
ADS 2 (IV stage) 
From HL 2 to ADS 
squib valves 
486, 488/492 pipe, branch 
ADS squib valves 476/479 mtrvlv 
IRWST 
PRHR bay 
800 pipe 
801 mtpljun 
Central bay 802 pipe 
Sparger bay 
803 pipe 
804 mtpljun 
Overflow 896 sngljun 
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Table 2: AP1000 Relap5 input model summary 
General zone Name Number Type 
897 tmdpvol 
898 sngljun 
IRWST discharge line 
811, 812 sngljun 
813, 814 pipe 
IRWST valve 815, 816 trpvlv 
PRHR 
PRHR inlet line 
823 sngljun 
824 pipe 
825 sngljun 
PRHR exch. tubes 826 pipe 
PRHR outlet line 
827 sngljun 
828 pipe 
829 trpvlv 
830 branch 
Steam Header 
Header connection 785 branch 
Upstream turbine line 786 pipe 
Turbine valve 787 mtrvlv 
Turbine valve 798 mtrvlv 
SL end volume 789, 799 tmdpvol 
Steam Dump 788 tmdpjun 
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Table 2: AP1000 Relap5 input model summary 
General zone Name Number Type 
Steam Dump end 
volume 
790 tmdpvol 
CVS 
CVS (1 pump) 942 tmdpjun 
CVS tank 943 tmdpvol 
CVS (2 pump) 944 tmdpjun 
CVS tank 945 tmdpvol 
CVS line 946 snglvol 
CVS connection to SG1 947 chkvlv 
CVS Letdown 
connection 
950 tmdpjun 
CVS Letdown tank 951 tmdpvol 
PRZ auxiliary spray 953 tmdpjun 
PRZ auxiliary spray 952 tmdpvol 
PRZ auxiliary spray line 948 branch 
PRZ auxiliary spray 
valve 
949 mtrvlv 
RNS 
IRWST line valve 840 trpvlv 
RNS line 841,847 branch 
Cask Loading Pit valve 843 trpvlv 
Cask Loading Pit tank 844 tmdpvol 
RNS line 845 snglvol 
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Table 2: AP1000 Relap5 input model summary 
General zone Name Number Type 
RNS pump 846 pump 
DVI1 discharge line 848 snglvol 
DVI1 connection 849 chkvlv 
DVI2 discharge line 850 snglvol 
DVI2 connection 851 chkvlv 
IRWST discharge line 852 pipe 
IRWST connection 853 trpvlv 
Containment 
Recirculation 
System 
Containment sump 162 pipe 
First MOV 163/183 trpvlv 
From first MOV to 
second MOV 
164/184 pipe 
Second MOV 165/185 trpvlv 
From second MOV to 
common header 
166/186 pipe 
Common header 174/194 Pipe 
Check valve 169/189 chkvlv 
From check valve to 
MOV 
170/190 pipe 
MOV 171/191 trpvlv 
From MOV to common 
header 
172/192 pipe 
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Table 2: AP1000 Relap5 input model summary 
General zone Name Number Type 
From common header to 
IRWST injection line 
175/195 Sngljun 
 
 
 
Figure 16: AP1000 RPV sub-regions 
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Figure 17: AP1000 RPV noding scheme 
 
3.2. Reactor Coolant System Main Loops (SGs primary side 
included) 
The two loops, each one containing one hot leg, one steam generator, two reactor coolant 
pumps and two cold legs are separately modeled. For each loop, the hot legs have been 
modeled by means of two branches, one for the horizontal part of the pipe and one for the 
sloping part, leading to the SG. The two cold legs can be subdivided in three regions: pump 
discharge, middle portion and portion up to downcomer connection. Figure 18 shows the 
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noding scheme of the main reactor coolant loops. For what the primary side of the steam 
generators is concerned, the inlet plenum, the U-tubes and the outlet plenum (to which the 
reactor coolant pumps are connected) are modeled as represented in Figure 19.  
Heat structures are introduced to simulate the hot legs and cold legs metallic structure. For 
each leg, one heat structure has been modeled: it is connected to the hydrodynamic volume 
on its left surface, while an insulation condition is set on the right surface, as the heat 
transfer from the fluid to the environment can be considered negligible. For what the 
primary side of the SGs is concerned, the U-tubes walls are simulated, together with the 
lower head walls and tube sheet.     
 
 
Figure 18: AP1000 main coolant loops noding scheme (x=2 for loop 1 and x=3 for loop 2) 
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Figure 19: AP1000 SG primary side noding scheme (loop 1) 
 
3.3. Reactor Coolant Pumps 
The RCPs have been modeled using the special hydrodynamic component “pump”, where 
both geometric and hydraulic data have been specified. The reactor coolant pumps are 
connected to the SGs outlet plena and discharge in the two cold legs. The homologous 
curves of pump head and pump torque have been introduced in order to describe the pump 
performance in all the operating conditions, i. e. the four quadrants: normal pump, energy 
dissipation, normal turbine, reverse pump performance.  
 
3.4. Pressurizer 
The pressurizer model consists of the following regions or subsystems: 
 The surge line, simulated by a pipe component and connected to the hot leg of loop 
1; 
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 The pressurizer (bottom head, cylindrical part and upper head) connected to the 
surge line; 
 RCS overpressure protection system: the PRZ safety valves are simulated with two 
motor valves which connect the PRZ head to two tmdpvol components simulating 
the containment at atmospheric pressure; 
 Spray system: it connects the cold legs A and B of loop 1, just downstream of the 
pumps discharge, to the PRZ head;  
 Proportional and backup heaters, simulated by the heat structures associated to the 
PRZ. 
 
 
Figure 20: AP1000 Pressurizer noding scheme 
 
3.5. Automatic Depressurization System 
The Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) consists of four different valve stages that 
open sequentially to reduce RCS pressure.  
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The ADS valves for stages 1, 2 and 3 are located in lines connected to the pressurizer, 
whereas the ADS final stage valves are located in lines connected to the hot legs. The 
piping and valves for the first three ADS stages are arranged in two identical trains, each 
containing one stage 1 path, one stage 2 path and one stage 3 path, a common inlet line 
connected to the PRZ top and a common discharge line connected to the sparger in the 
IRWST. The ADS final stage consists of two valves trains, one connected to the PRHR 
inlet line and the other connected to the loop 2 hot leg. Each train consists of two lines, 
containing a normally closed ADS squib valve discharging directly to the containment 
atmosphere. Figure 21 and Figure 22 show the model scheme for the first three stages and 
for the fourth stage respectively. 
 
 
Figure 21: ADS stages 1, 2 and 3 noding scheme (train A) 
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Figure 22: ADS stages 4 noding scheme 
 
3.6. Steam generators (secondary side) 
The nodalization scheme of Steam Generators is reported in Figure 23. 
The following zones can be recognized (component numbers refer to loop 1): 
 SG primary side, including inlet plenum, U tubes and outlet plenum, simulated by a 
pipe (225); 
 the feed water ring (510); 
 the downcomer, simulated by an annulus (520); 
 the riser, modeled by means of a pipe (530), subdivided in 18 nodes: the first 14 
volumes are thermally connected to the primary side U-tubes, while the other nodes 
simulate the channels feeding the separators swirl; 
 the separators, modeled through the component “separator” (550); 
 the top of SG (570); 
 
Heat structures are used to simulate the U-tube walls, steam generator inlet and outlet 
plena, tube sheet, shroud and shell. 
Furthermore the following sub-systems are modeled, as shown in Figure 24: 
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 Steam line: each steam line departing from each SG dome and leading to the 
steam header is separately modeled together with the steam header itself. 
Downstream the steam header the four steam lines have been collapsed in one 
component having the same hydraulic characteristics;  
 Turbine: the turbine is simulated by two tmdpvol components: one is used for 
steady state achievement and the other during transients simulations. The 
turbine representation is very schematic but it is judged suitable for the analyses 
to be performed with the developed AP1000 Relap5 input model. In particular 
what is important is to be able to simulate the turbine isolation signal, for which 
a schematic representation of the turbine is sufficient; 
 Containment Isolation: the main steam line isolation valve is simulated with a 
motor valve (583) joining components 581 and 584 (components numbers refer 
to SG-1);  
 Secondary Side Overpressure Protection: each Steam Generator is equipped 
with six safety relief valves, plus one PORV. The six safety valves have been 
collapsed into three components, modeled through the motor valves 591, 593 
and 595 connecting the outlet of the steam dome (570) to time dependent 
volumes simulating the external environment at atmospheric conditions. The 
PORV is modeled by means of another motor valve (597) (components 
numbers refer to SG-1). 
 The feed water injection is simulated schematically by means of time dependent 
junctions (Figure 15). 
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Figure 23: Steam generator noding scheme (loop 1) 
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Figure 24: Steam generator system noding scheme (loop 1) 
 
3.7. Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger 
The PRHR-HX (Figure 25) consists of inlet and outlet channel heads connected by vertical 
C-shaped tubes. The PRHR-HX inlet and outlet lines are connected to RCS loop 1, 
respectively to the hot leg and to the SG cold leg plenum. The model of the PRHR-HX can 
be subdivided into four main regions: inlet line, inlet and outlet PRHR-HX channel heads, 
PRHR-HX tubes, outlet line: they have all been modeled. 
The PRHR-HX inlet line connects to the top of the loop 1 hot leg: it has been modeled with 
a pipe component (824). PRHR-HX tubes are simulated by means of pipe 826 
characterized by 8 nodes and by the associated heat structures. The PRHR-HX channel 
heads consist of two volumes located at the HX inlet and HX outlet, respectively. The 
channel heads are identical and their shape consists of a hemispheric portion coupled to a 
cylindrical portion. These volumes are simulated by means of branches 825 and 827. The 
PRHR outlet line is simulated by means of pipe 828 (representing the line connecting the 
HX exit to the Air Operated Valve (AOV)), valve 829 (representing the AOV), branch 830 
(representing the AOV discharge volume) and pipe 831 (representing the line connecting 
to the SG, see Figure 25 and also Figure 15).   
Only the PRHR-HX tubes walls have been simulated by means of heat structures which 
couple the PRHR-HX tubes to the IRWST, where strong water recirculation occurs upon 
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PRHR-HX operation: such water recirculation is simulated in the model (see IRWST 
model description). 
 
 
Figure 25: PRHR HX noding scheme 
 
3.8. In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank 
IRWST provides low pressure gravity injection to each of the two direct vessel injection 
connections. These injection lines are shared with the accumulators and CMTs. It also 
provides heat sink for the PRHR heat exchanger and receives discharge from the first three 
ADS stages. 
The tank has been modeled by three pipe components, vertically oriented. The first pipe is 
the PRHR Bay 800, the second the Central Bay 802, the third is the Sparger Bay 803. The 
PRHR Bay is the portion of the pool that contains the vertical portion of the PRHR. It is 
connected at the bottom and the top to the central bay by two vertically oriented junctions. 
Multiple - cross flow junctions allows for water recirculation within IRWST. The 
arrangement of the IRWST is reported in Figure 26.  
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Figure 26: IRWST noding scheme 
 
The discharge line, connecting the IRWST to the DVI line, is simulated by means of the 
following components (numbers between brackets refer to loop 2): 
 single junction 811 (812), joining the pipe 802, simulating the IRWST Central bay, 
to the discharge pipe 813 (814); 
 pipe 813 (814), simulating the discharge line 1 (2), respectively; 
 check valve 815 (816), connecting the pipe 813 (814) to the pipe 864 (884), 
simulating the DVI line. 
 
3.9. Core Make-up Tanks 
The CMT model can be subdivided into three regions: balance line, discharge line and 
CMT tank. A scheme of the CMT nodalization is reported in Figure 27. The two CMTs 
have the same hydrodynamic characteristics: in the following, values in brackets are 
referred to CMT B. 
The balance line is simulated by the pipes 857 (877) and 858 (878). The sngljun 855 (875) 
simulates the always open motor valve, while branch 859 (879) the CMT inlet. The CMT 
injection line is constituted by pipe 862 (882), subdivided into 2 volumes, and a branch 
866 (886). The motor valve 861 (881) simulates the CMT discharge motor valve, which is 
normally closed and opens on “S” signal, ADS actuation, etc. The junction 863 (883), 
connecting the discharge line to the DVI line, has been simulated with a check valve, in 
order to prevent reverse flow in the CMT loop. The branch 866 (886) simulates the tee 
connection with RNS injection line, while junction 867 (887) represents the connection to 
 
 
Component 
Number  
Central bay  802 Sparger bay  803 Vol. 
height 10 10 (1) 1.2500 29.0000 
9 9 896 1.1980 27.8020 
8 8 1.0000 26.8020 
7 6 7 3.3125 23.4895 
6 PRHR  5 6 3.5833 19.9062 
5 Bay 4 5 3.5833 16.3229 
4 800 3 4 3.5833 12.7396 
3 2 3 3.5833 9.1563 
2 1 2 3.3125 5.8438 
1 y 1 5.8438 0 
(1) Crossflow Junction to simulate Overflow - Vent Area is also attributed to this 
El. from  
Bottom 
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the RPV. The CMT tank is modeled using a pipe [860 (880)] composed by 20 volumes. 
The detailed schematization of the tank is needed in order to simulate a realistic behavior 
of the CMT tank draining. In fact, due to RELAP5 code models limitation related to the 
evaluation of heat transfer area, condensation is one of the phenomenology that can affect 
CMT performances. If large nodes are used, strong steam condensation occurs on the CMT 
cold walls and at the cold CMT water interface, preventing the tank to drain. The use of a 
more detailed nodalization (i.e. thinner nodes) can limit the occurrence of this 
phenomenon. The metallic structures of CMT tank and lines have been modeled with four 
heat structures (for each CMT), simulating respectively injection and balance line, CMT 
upper head, CMT cylindrical part and CMT lower head walls.  
 
 
 
Figure 27: CMT noding scheme (CMT A) 
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3.10. Accumulators 
The Accumulators System consists of two trains (ACC1 and ACC2), each composed by a 
tank, a discharge line, an isolation valve and two check valves. ACC1 and ACC2 discharge 
water in DVI1 and in DVI2, respectively. The ACC1 (ACC2) system has been modeled 
using the special RELAP5 hydrodynamic component “accumulator”. In the “accumulator” 
model input cards, all the data referring to the tank geometry, to the discharge line and 
valves configuration and to the hydraulic parameters have been set according to the 
nominal safeguard data. 
 
3.11. Chemical and Volume Control System 
RCS makeup function has been simulated, using two components: a tank (e.g. tmdpvol 
943) and a pump (e. g. tmdpjun 942) injecting the makeup water in the SG outlet plenum 
(volume 225). Furthermore the auxiliary PRZ spray and the letdown functions are taken 
into account. A scheme of the CVS nodalization is shown in Figure 28. Specific 
pressurizer water level setpoints control the operation of this system.  
 
 
Figure 28: Chemical and Volume Control System noding scheme 
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3.12. Startup Feedwater System and Steam Dump System 
The Startup Feedwater System (FWS) has been modeled as an interface to the Steam 
Generators. This means that for each steam generator a tmdpjun (508 for loop 1, 608 for 
loop 2) has been used which takes suction from a tmdpvol (509 for loop 1, 609 for loop 2) 
and injects the required flow to the dedicated steam generator. The startup feedwater 
system flow is imposed to each tmdpjun. Specific steam generator water level and cold leg 
temperature setpoints control the operation of this system.  
The steam dump has been simulated through a time dependent junction (788) which 
connects the steam header to a time dependent volume (790).  
 
3.13. Normal Residual Heat Removal System  
In the AP1000 design, the normal residual heat removal system has several functions. In 
the developed AP1000 Relap5 model only the following functions have been taken into 
account: 
 Low Pressure Reactor Coolant System Makeup and Cooling; 
 In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank Cooling. 
A scheme of the RNS nodalization is shown in Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29: Normal Residual Heat Removal System noding scheme 
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3.14. Containment Recirculation System 
A scheme of the Containment Recirculation System noding is shown in Figure 30. Pipe 
component 162 represents the containment sump in which, following a LOCA, water 
accumulates. Water can be passively re-injected from the sump to the RPV by means of 
two trains (A and B) of two lines each which take suction from the sump and are connected 
to the IRWST injection lines. From here water can reach the DVI lines and, hence, the 
RPV. The lines from containment sump to IRWST injection lines are shown in Figure 30.  
 
 Figure 30: Containment Recirculation System noding scheme 
 
3.15. Control and Protection System 
Combination of several control variables, general tables and trips allows for the 
simulations of the plant protection and safety monitoring system. The following control 
logic has been implemented: reactor trip, Safeguard (S) actuation signal, turbine trip, main 
feed water and main steam line isolation, CMTs injection, reactor coolant pumps trip, 
PRHR HX actuation, SGs PORV actuation, ADS actuation, PRZ spray actuation, PRZ 
heaters actuation, startup feedwater actuation, CVS operation, steam dump actuation, 
containment recirculation system actuation.  
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3.16. Steady state calculations 
Some dedicated control options are activated during steady state calculations in order to 
reach the steady state at the specified conditions. At a specified time instant these 
dedicated controls are disabled and the run is continued in order to verify that a good 
steady state has been actually reached. The table below reports a small portion of steady 
state calculation results for the nominal reactor operating conditions: they are compared to 
the reference values. It can be seen that deviations are negligible.  
 
Table 3: AP1000 Relap5 steady state calculation results summary 
Plant parameter  BEF 0% value  Relap value  %Error°  
Vessel flow (lb/s)  33,444 33,444 - 
Thimble flow (lb/s)  635 614 3.4% 
Bypass flow (cavity + shroud + 
nozzle leakage) lb/s  
835 838 0.36% 
Head cooling flow (lb/s)  501 498 0.6% 
PRZ pressure (psia)  2250 2250 - 
Core out temp. F  614 613.3 0.11% 
Vessel out temp F  610 609.7 0.05% 
SG out temp F  536.9 536.2 0.13% 
Core in temp F  537.2 536.6 0.11% 
Steam pressure (psia)  850 848 0.24% 
SG steam flow (lb/s)  2079.2 2077.5 0.08% 
SG level (from tubesheet), ft  46.285 46.285 - 
Heat exchanged by each SG 
(MW)  
1707.5 1707.4 - 
 
(°)The % error is defined as:                 
| valuemeasuredor  reference|
 | valuecalculated -  valuemeasuredor  reference|
100
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4. Pre-operational tests: procedures definition and pre-
tests calculations 
As explained in section 1.2, one of the steps in the AP1000 licensing process is the 
execution of some pre-operational tests on the first three built plants in order to 
demonstrate the proper operation of the “first of a kind” systems. Such tests have to be 
successfully performed to be allowed to load the nuclear fuel and to start power operation.  
In this chapter the selected pre-operational tests, i. e. CMTs hot recirculation and 
draindown tests and the ADS tests, are described in detail: first the AP1000 Relap5 model 
adaptation to reproduce the actual RPV configuration which will be used for tests 
performance is described. Then for each of the three pre-operational tests, the test 
procedure and simulation results are reported. The following Table 4 summarizes the tests 
procedures.   
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Table 4: pre-operational tests procedures 
TEST DESCRIPTION INITIAL CONDITIONS RELAP5 RUN DESCRIPTION  
1 CMTs hot recirculation test RCS temperature: about 540 °F (555 K) 
PRZ pressure: 2250 psia (15.5 MPaa)  
PRZ level: 58% of span 
Secondary loops at about 540 °F (555 K) 
and corresponding saturation pressure 
(about 962 psi, i. e. 6.6 MPa), isolated from 
turbine 
ACCs, PRHR, ADS, RNS, etc. disabled 
RCPs at maximum speed 
The plant is at the initial conditions summarized in column 3. The test starts opening the CMTs discharge 
valves and tripping the RCPs with 10 s delay. The operation of CMTs in water recirculation mode is verified: 
the RPV cools down and the CMTs heat up. The test is secured closing the CMTs discharge valves once the 
CMTs discharge valves mass flow rate zeros. 
2 CMTs draindown test  Same as for CMTs recirculation test (TEST 
1) with the following differences: 
o PRZ level: 25% span 
o CMTs temperature as at the end 
of CMTs hot recirculation test 
o All ADS stages but 1A disabled 
The plant is at the initial conditions summarized in column 3. The RCPs are tripped and the test is initiated 
with an ADS actuation signal after the RCPs have been tripped. This signal leads to open the CMTs discharge 
valves with a small delay and ADS train A stage 1 control valve opening. Due to ADS stage 1 operation, the 
primary system depressurizes and the operator opens the SGs PORVs when PRZ pressure becomes 300 psi 
(2.07 MPa) smaller than SGs pressure. The operation of the CMTs in water recirculation mode, the transition 
from recirculation to draindown mode and the operation in draindown mode are verified. The test is secured 
closing the CMTs discharge valves, the ADS stage 1 control valve and the SGs PORVs when CMTs level 
reaches the ADS stage 4 actuation set-point. 
3 ADS test  Same as for CMTs recirculation test (TEST 
1), with CMTs disabled and both ADS 
trains enabled. 
The plant is at the initial conditions summarized in column 3. The RCPs are tripped and the test is initiated 
with an ADS actuation signal which opens the first three ADS stages starting from stage 1 followed by stage 2 
and stage 3 after short time delays. The operator opens the SGs PORVs when PRZ pressure becomes 300 psi 
smaller than SGs pressure. Once the ADS control valves are fully open, the spargers are tested at full flow for 
10 s and then operators start closing the ADS isolation valves one at a time in the reverse order, with each 
close command following a 10 s delay after the previous one. Once all the isolation valves are closed, SGs 
PORVs start closing and the test is secured. 
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4.1. Relap5 input model modifications 
It has to be noted that the selected tests are performed without any nuclear fuel in the 
Reactor Pressure Vessel, hence without any decay heat. The successful demonstration of 
these tests (as well as of other tests on the Passive Core Cooling System) is needed to be 
allowed to load the nuclear fuel.  
In order to represent the vessel configuration which will be used to perform these tests, the 
Relap model as described in chapter 3, has been slightly modified (see Figure 31 and 
Figure 32) respect to its reference configuration. In particular the components representing 
the core and the core bypass have been substituted with a single pipe component of the 
same height but with the total cross flow area equal to that included within the core shroud 
plates. Furthermore the heat structures which were connected to the old pipe components 
representing core and bypass have been disabled, as it was reactor kinetics. In this way the 
Reactor Pressure Vessel input reflects the exact configuration which will be used to 
perform the tests. 
 
Figure 31: standard RPV noding  
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Figure 32: modified RPV noding used for the performed pre-tests calculations 
 
4.2. CMTs hot recirculation test 
The following two paragraphs describe the CMTs hot recirculation test procedure and 
simulation results respectively. 
 
4.2.1. CMTs hot recirculation test procedure 
This test verifies that CMTs will operate in natural circulation, cooling the RCS while the 
CMTs are heated up by the recirculated flow from the cold legs. The AP1000 Design 
Control Document requires this test, as well as the others, to be performed at a RCS 
temperature greater than 550 K (530 °F) and normal operating pressure (2250 psi, i. e. 15.5 
MPa). A temperature of 540 °F (555 K) has been judged appropriate for this test, as well as 
for the others. The secondary side is also at 540 °F (555 K) since all the selected tests are 
performed at zero power, before loading the nuclear fuel. As said, in order to be allowed to 
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load the nuclear fuel, the whole envisaged test program has to be successfully completed. 
Initial pressurizer water level is programmed at the upper bound of the normal operating 
range to reduce the requirement for makeup as the RCS cools due to CMTs water 
recirculation, and the PRZ heaters are in automatic control. Various Protection and Safety 
Monitoring System (PMS) safeguards signals will have to be blocked to prevent unneeded 
equipment actuation (this applies to all the tests). At test initiation the Startup Feedwater 
System (FWS) is feeding both Steam Generators (SGs) and turbine bypass valves and/or 
SGs PORVs
3
 are controlling RCS temperature and SGs pressure. The test is initiated by 
simulating a safety signal to open the CMTs outlet isolation valves; all the Reactor Coolant 
Pumps (RCPs) are tripped after a time delay of 10 seconds. Feedwater is simultaneously 
secured to the SGs. Turbine bypass valves or PORVs are closed. This procedure is chosen 
to be able to verify, without any doubt, that natural circulation is due to CMT—RCS 
average temperature difference and not from that between SGs—RCS. The CMTs water 
recirculation test is continued until the CMTs discharged mass flow rate zeros. At this 
point CMTs discharge valves are closed and it is verified whether the average temperature 
in the CMTs has reached a temperature indicative of recirculation - 350 °F (450 K) - as 
required in the AP1000 Design Control Document. Once this has been verified, RCPs are 
started to heat up the RCS back up to 540 °F in preparation for the draindown test. 
 
4.2.2. CMTs hot recirculation test simulation results 
The first 3000 s of the Relap5 run are used to reach the initial conditions reported in Table 
4. At 3000 s the CMTs discharge valves are opened and the turbine stop valves are closed 
(SGs isolation), and at 3010 s the RCPs are tripped.  
Figure 33
4
 shows the mass flow rate entering the CMT A through the corresponding 
pressure balance line and the mass flow rate discharged through CMT A discharge valves 
(for CMT B the trend is practically the same, as shown in Figure 34). It can be seen that, as 
soon as the CMTs discharge valves open, the CMTs start injecting cold water into RPV 
                                                          
3
 Whether to use SGs PORVs or turbine bypass valves to evacuate the produced steam, does not affect the 
test results.   
4
 The initial spike is due to the fact that, in this test, when CMTs discharge valves open, the Reactor Coolant 
Pumps are running (it is recalled that the pressure balance lines inlet is downstream loop 2 reactor coolant 
pumps). They are tripped after 10 s. 
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while hot water enters the CMTs from the pressure balance lines (the outlet mass flow rate 
is bigger than inlet mass flow rate). The mass flow rate through CMTs discharge valves 
continues for thousands of seconds until it practically zeroes. At the end of the test the 
water mass injected into RPV from CMT A (integral of discharged mass flow rate) is about 
97% of the mass initially stored (Figure 35). Hence, at the end of the transient, each CMT, 
operating in water recirculation mode, has discharged a total mass practically equal to the 
initial CMT inventory; in other terms all the water initially stored in the CMTs is actively 
mixed with the RCS water inventory. 
The cold water discharged from the CMTs enters the RPV downcomer through the DVI 
lines: it cools the RPV flowing downward through the downcomer, then it reaches the 
lower plenum, the core region (core structures not present) and the upper plenum/head. 
This is shown in Figure 36
5
. 
 
Figure 33: mass flow rate entering and exiting CMT A [% of max flow] 
                                                          
5
 The water stratification in the RPV is due to the fact that the CMTs water, injected in the downcomer via 
the DVI lines, mixes with the initially hot water within the RPV and it is heated up, diminishing its “cooling 
power”. 
It should be noted that, at about 7500 s, the mass flow rate practically zeroes. At that time, the downcomer 
wall temperature has remained few degrees higher than lower plenum wall temperature (it is recalled that the 
vessel cylindrical wall is thicker than lower head wall): this explains why downcomer water temperature 
increases few degrees after about 7500 s. Furthermore at about 6200 s, a small flow reversal is predicted in 
loop 1 (PRHR loop). Some hot water from loop-1 hot leg enters the upper plenum and this explains the upper 
plenum water temperature behavior around 6200 s.  
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Figure 34: mass flow rate entering and exiting the CMTs [% of max flow] 
 
 
 
Figure 35: water mass injected in RPV from CMT A [% of CMT initial water mass]  
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Figure 36: water temperature in some RPV regions [K] 
 
While the CMTs are discharging cold water into RPV, hot water enters the tanks through 
the cold legs pressure balance lines (Figure 37). At the end of the transient the lowest sub-
volume has reached a temperature of about 381.5 K (i. e. 227 °F), while the average CMT 
temperature is about 460 K (i. e. 368 °F, mass averaged temperature). Hence the objective 
of the test to have CMTs at a temperature greater than 350 °F (450 K, see section 4.2.1) is 
achieved.  
Figure 38 shows the mass flow rate entering hot leg 2 and Figure 39 shows the CMT A 
balance line mass flow rate, cold leg 2A to RPV mass flow rate, SG-2 to cold leg 2A mass 
flow rate. It can be seen that hot leg 2 mass flow rate zeros and eventually reverses, while 
the CMTs mass flow rates are still significant (Figure 33), hence CTMs water does not 
enter the SGs anymore.  
From Figure 39, we distinguish three time intervals:  
 before about 3400 s the mass flow rate reaching the cold leg 2A from SG-2 enters 
in part the RPV downcomer and in part the CMT A balance line; 
 from about 3400 s to about 4600 s the mass flow rate from SG-2 to cold leg 2A is 
still positive (it zeroes at about 4600 s) while the mass flow rate from cold leg 2A 
to RPV downcomer has become negative: this means that CMT A pressure balance 
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line is fed in part through the water coming from SG-2 and in part through the 
water coming from RPV downcomer; 
 after about 4600 s the mass flow rate from SG-2 to cold leg 2A zeroes while the 
mass flow rate entering the cold leg from RPV downcomer equals the CMT A 
pressure balance line mass flow rate. This means that now CMT A pressure balance 
line is fed only through the water coming from RPV upper downcomer.  
The same applies to CMT-B, CMT-B pressure balance line and cold leg 2B. 
 
 
Figure 37: water temperature in CMT A [K] 
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Figure 38: mass flow rate entering hot leg 2 [% of max flow]  
 
 
Figure 39: CMT A balance line mass flow rate, cold leg 2A to RPV mass flow rate, SG-2 to 
cold leg 2A mass flow rate [% of max flow] 
 
Figure 40 shows the temperatures in the hot leg 2. It can be seen that the temperature 
initially, until about 4600 s, goes down because of CMT injection and because the mass 
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flow reverses (Figure 38) and temperature in hot leg 2 increases. Figure 41 shows the 
temperature in cold leg 2A (for cold leg 2B it is similar): the temperature goes down 
because of CMTs operation. 
 
Figure 40: loop 2 hot leg temperature [K] 
 
 
 
Figure 41: cold leg 2A temperature [K] 
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The PRZ dome pressure and PRZ water volume are shown in Figure 42 and Figure 43 
respectively: when CMTs discharge valves are actuated, PRZ pressure decreases, then it is 
recovered by means of the PRZ heaters operation. Moreover, because of RCS cooldown 
due to CMTs operation, PRZ water volume decreases.  
 
 
Figure 42: PRZ pressure [Pa] 
 
 
 
Figure 43:  PRZ water volume [m
3
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From the figures and transient description reported above it can be seen that the performed 
CMTs hot recirculation test simulation shows that CMTs are able to operate in water 
recirculation mode, cooling down the RPV. Furthermore, the CMTs average temperature 
reaches, at the end of the test, a final value of about 368 °F (460 K), hence greater than the 
limit value of 350 °F (450 K) specified in the AP1000 Design Control Document. 
 
 
4.3. CMTs draindown test 
The following two paragraphs describe the CMTs draindown test procedure and simulation 
results respectively. 
4.3.1. CMTs draindown test procedure 
The goal of this test is to verify the CMTs will transition from the recirculation mode to the 
draindown mode. This is done by depressurizing the RCS using one valve in the ADS: in 
this way the hot RCS water will flash and, in particular, steam will feed the CMTs pressure 
balance line causing the CMTs draindown. The smallest ADS valve (stage 1), with the 
maximum opening time, will be used in order to limit the mechanical and thermal stresses 
to the plant. This test is performed shortly after the CMTs hot recirculation test: the RCPs 
are restarted and the plant is re-heated while the temperature in the CMTs, isolated at the 
end of the CMTs hot recirculation test, remains the same as at the end of the first test. At 
test initiation startup feedwater is feeding both SGs, while turbine bypass valves and/or 
SGs PORVs are controlling RCS temperature and SGs pressure. The pressurizer (PRZ) 
level is lower in order to allow a quicker draindown. PRZ heaters are disabled in order to 
prevent any heaters uncovering while they are energized. The test is initiated tripping all 
the RCPs and closing the turbine bypass valves and/or SGs PORVs and securing the 
startup feedwater. After a time delay, an ADS actuation signal is generated. This signal 
leads to open the CMTs discharge valves and, then, the only activated ADS stage 1 
discharge valve. The RCS depressurization, due to ADS stage 1 operation, is expected to 
trigger the CMTs draindown after a certain time. Operators are instructed to open SGs 
PORVs whenever the RCS pressure becomes 300 psi (2.07 MPa) smaller than SGs 
pressure: this is done in order to limit the reverse pressure difference between primary and 
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secondary side. The draindown is continued until the water level in the CMTs reaches the 
ADS stage 4 actuation set-point. Then the test is secured closing the CMTs discharge 
valves, the ADS stage 1 control valve and the SGs PORVs.  
 
4.3.2. CMTs draindown test simulation results 
The first 800 s of the Relap5 run are used to reach the initial conditions specified in Table 
4
6
. At 800 s the RCPs are tripped and an ADS actuation signal occurs with a specified 
delay (only train A stage 1 is enabled). This signal leads to the opening of the CMTs 
discharge valves and ADS train A stage 1 control valve opening.  
Figure 44 shows the mass flow rate through ADS stage 1 control valve: mass flow rate 
initially increases, until stage 1 control valve has reached the fully open position; then it 
decreases because valve operation is depressurizing the primary system (Figure 45). The 
primary water swelling due to RCS depressurization sudden fills the PRZ (Figure 46
7
, 
Figure 47 and Figure 48) and the liquid fraction at stage 1 control valve sudden increases 
(Figure 49). This results in the increasing of the mass flow rate discharged through ADS 
stage 1 control valve. Then the combined operation of stage 1 control valve and SGs 
PORVs, which open when the PRZ pressure has become 300 psi (2.07 MPa) smaller then 
SGs pressure, is responsible for the mass flow rate decrease. When the CMTs water 
volume has reached the stage 4 actuation set point, the stage 1 control valve is closed 
(together with CMTs discharge valves and SGs PORVs) and the test is secured. 
                                                          
6
 This test simulation is performed after the first one, so that the input file contains the conditions reached at 
the end of the first simulation. This allows a faster steady state attainment which occurs in about 800 s. 
7
 It should be noted that in the AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System architecture, 0% PRZ span 
and 100% PRZ span do not correspond to completely full and completely void PRZ respectively. In 
particular, when the level is 100% span, the PRZ is not yet completely full of water but there is still some 
space to accommodate more liquid water. Hence, the level can go beyond 100% span.   
 87 
 
 
Figure 44: mass flow rate through ADS stage 1 control valve [% of max flow] 
 
 
 
Figure 45: PRZ steam pressure [Pa] 
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Figure 46: PRZ water level [% of span] 
 
 
 
Figure 47: PRZ water volume [m
3
] 
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Figure 48: PRZ surge line inlet mass flow rate [% of max flow] 
 
 
 
Figure 49: liquid fraction at ADS stage 1 control valve [-] 
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Figure 50 shows the mass flow rate through CMT A discharge valves (for CMT B it is 
practically the same, as shown in Figure 51) and CMT A pressure balance line (for CMT B 
it is practically the same, as shown in Figure 51), Figure 52 shows the liquid fraction in 
cold leg 2A (for cold leg 2B it is practically the same) and CMT A pressure balance line 
inlet (for CMT B pressure balance line inlet it is practically the same). It can be seen that 
until the pressure balance line is full of water, the CMTs operate in water circulation mode 
with the cold discharged mass flow rate bigger than the hot mass flow rate entering the 
CMTs through the pressure balance lines (Figure 50). At about 1700-1750 s, some 
significant void forms in the pressure balance lines because of RCS depressurization due to 
ADS stage 1 operation. When the void fraction in the cold legs becomes significant and 
stable (Figure 52), the pressure balance lines are fed mainly by steam (they void).  This 
causes a rapid voiding of the CMTs. In this phase the discharged mass flow rate rapidly 
increases (Figure 50) to values of about 2.5 times the recirculation value. The CMTs 
transition from their recirculation mode to their draindown mode has just occurred and it is 
well visible from the plotted figures. When the water volume in the CMTs reaches the 
ADS 4 actuation set point, the test is secured closing the CMTs discharge valve and the 
stage 1 control valve.  
 
Figure 50: mass flow rate through CMT A discharge valves and CMT A pressure balance 
line [% of max flow]  
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Figure 51: mass flow rate through CMTs discharge valves and CMTs pressure balance lines 
[% of max flow] 
 
 
 
Figure 52: liquid fraction in cold leg 2A and CMT A pressure balance line inlet [-] 
 
Figure 53 shows the CMT A and CMT B outlet temperatures. As the CMTs voiding 
proceeds, the hotter water initially contained in the upper part is discharged.    
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Figure 53: CMT A outlet temperature and CMT B outlet temperature [K] 
 
From the figures and transient description reported above, it can be seen that, the 
performed CMTs draindown test simulation clearly shows the ability of the CMTs to 
transition from water recirculation to water draindown mode, as required in the AP1000 
Design Control Document (2010). 
 
4.4. ADS test 
The following two paragraphs describe the ADS test procedure and simulation results 
respectively. 
 
4.4.1. ADS test procedure 
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SGs PORVs are controlling RCS temperature and SGs pressure. The test is initiated by 
tripping the RCPs and closing the turbine bypass valves and/or SGs PORVs. The ADS 
actuation signal is generated after a delay allowing RCS flow coastdown. Once the ADS 
control valves are all fully open, the spargers are tested at full flow for 10 seconds. 
Furthermore operators are instructed to open SGs PORVs whenever the RCS pressure 
becomes 300 psi (2.07 MPa) smaller than SGs pressure: this is done in order to limit the 
reverse pressure difference between primary and secondary side. Once the spargers have 
been exposed to full flow for ten seconds, the ADS isolation valves are closed starting 
from stage 3 and then, after short time delays, continuing with stage 2 and 1. Once all the 
ADS stages have been closed, i. e. the RCS is not being depressurized anymore by ADS 
operation, the test is completed closing the SGs PORVs.   
 
4.4.2. ADS test simulation results 
The first 500 s of the Relap5 run are used to reach the initial conditions reported in Table 
3
8
. At 500 s the RCPs are tripped (Figure 54) and at 980 s an ADS actuation signal occurs.  
ADS stage 1 control valves start opening (Figure 55) discharging the loop seals water 
(stage 1 liquid fraction becomes 0 in Figure 56) and then steam. After some delay also 
stage 2 control valves start opening discharging the corresponding loop seals water (stage 2 
liquid fraction becomes 0 in Figure 56) and then steam. Because of RCS depressurization 
due to ADS operation (Figure 57) saturation conditions are reached within the primary 
loop: primary coolant swelling causes the PRZ to fill with water (Figure 58, Figure 59 and 
Figure 60) and a two-phase mixture is discharged through ADS stage 2 and stage 1 control 
valves (stage 1 and stage 2 liquid fraction are not 0 anymore in Figure 56) with an increase 
in the discharged mass flow rate (Figure 55).  
Finally stage 3 control valves open discharging a two phase mixture (Figure 55 and Figure 
56).  
When the PRZ pressure has become 300 psi (2.07 MPa) lower than SGs pressure, 
operators open SGs PORVs, as shown in Figure 62. It has to be noted that, PORVs 
actuation depressurizes and cools the secondary side but the effect on the primary side, 
                                                          
8
 This test simulation is performed after the second one, so that the input file contains the conditions reached 
at the end of the first simulation. This allows a faster steady state attainment which occurs in about 500 s. 
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even if present, is practically negligible in comparison to the depressurization and cooling 
action of both ADS trains (Figure 61).   
When all the ADS control valves are fully open, the spargers are tested in these conditions 
for 10 s. Then the securing procedure starts: operators start closing ADS isolation valves 
one at a time in the reverse order (starting from ADS stage 1 isolation valve), with each 
close command following a small delay after the previous one. Once all the ADS isolation 
valves are closed, and hence the primary side is not being depressurized anymore, SGs 
PORVs close and the test is secured. 
 
 
Figure 54:  RCS flow fraction [% of nominal]
9
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 It can be seen that the initial RCS flow is higher than nominal, since the RCPs are at the maximum speed 
and, since the core is not present, the primary system pressure drops are smaller. 
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Figure 55: mass flow rate through ADS train A stage 1, stage 2 and stage 3 control valves [% 
of max flow]  
 
 
 
Figure 56:  liquid fraction at ADS train A stage 1, stage 2 and stage 3 control valves [-] 
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Figure 57:  PRZ steam pressure and RCS pressure (at SG 1 pressure tap) [Pa] 
 
 
 
Figure 58: PRZ water level [% of span] 
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Figure 59: PRZ water volume [% of max] 
 
 
 
Figure 60: PRZ surge line mass flow rate [% of max] 
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Figure 61: pressure in PRZ dome, SG 1 dome and SG 2 dome [Pa] 
 
 
 
Figure 62: mass flow rate discharged through SG 1 PORV and SG 2 PORV [% of max] 
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be seen that, before reaching the saturation conditions, practically only steam is discharged 
through ADS. When saturation conditions are reached in the RCS, the total discharged 
mass flow rate contains only a small part of steam (Figure 63). Moreover the quantity of 
steam within the discharged mass flow rate increases from ADS control valve to ADS 
sparger because some part of the discharged liquid flashes along the ADS piping (Figure 
64).  
 
 
 
Figure 63: total mass flow rate entering ADS train A and total steam mass flow rate at ADS 
train A control valves [% of max] 
 
-2.00E+01
0.00E+00
2.00E+01
4.00E+01
6.00E+01
8.00E+01
1.00E+02
1.20E+02
1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500
m
a
ss
 f
lo
w
 r
a
te
 [
%
 o
f 
m
a
x
]
time [s]
ADS train A mass flow rate
ADS total flow rate
ADS steam mass flow rate
 100 
 
 
Figure 64: total steam mass flow rate at ADS train A control valves and total steam mass flow 
rate at ADS train A sparger [% of max] 
 
Figure 65, Figure 66, Figure 67 and Figure 68 shows the temperatures in some portions of 
the primary system: all the temperatures decrease because of RCS depressurization. 
 
 
Figure 65: water temperature in hot leg 1 and in hot leg 2 [K] 
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Figure 66: water temperature in cold leg 1A and in cold leg 2A [K] 
 
 
 
Figure 67: PRZ steam temperature [K] 
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Figure 68: PRZ water temperature [K] 
Figure 69 shows the SG 1 and SG 2 steam temperature: it can be seen that temperatures 
remain practically constant until SGs PORVs actuation. Then temperatures decrease 
because of SGs depressurization due to PORVs operation (Figure 62). When SGs PORVs 
close, temperatures slightly increase because of heat released by metallic structures 
surrounding SGs domes (Figure 70). 
 
 
Figure 69: SG 1 steam temperature and SG 2 steam temperature [K] 
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Figure 70: SG 1 upper shell inner wall temperature and SG 1 steam temperature [K] 
 
From the figures and transient description reported above, it can be seen that the ADS test, 
as currently planned, allows for the reproduction of the main phenomena due to this system 
operation. Furthermore the SGs PORVs opening (in order to limit the pressure difference 
between the primary and secondary side, once primary side pressure has become lower 
than the primary side one) does not impact on the primary side pressure, hence on the ADS 
behavior.   
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5. Design Basis Accident Analyses with suitable 
combination of active and passive systems 
As explained in sections 1.1 and 1.3, the AP1000 DCD safety analyses demonstrate that 
the AP1000 can cope against all the DBAs employing only passive safety features with no 
need for external power or operator action. In other words, AP1000 DiD systems, which 
are assumed not to be available in DCD analyses, do not contribute to the nuclear safety of 
the plant which is guaranteed by passive features. Anyway, being designed against high 
standards, they could be available also following a DBA. Such scenario is analyzed in this 
part of the thesis. 
The DiD systems are actually designed to prevent passive systems actuation for the more 
common (i. e. intact loop) transients. In this thesis their impact on more uncommon 
accidents, such as LOCAs, is investigated. In particular, for the two selected accidents, a 
1” SBLOCA and an inadvertent ADS actuation signal, the availability of the Normal 
Residual Heat Removal System (RNS) is postulated. In the AP1000 safety analyses, for 
both these accidents, the ADS stage 4 squib valves open allowing IRWST water injection 
and securing the transient. The availability of RNS could avoid the requirement on the 4
th
  
stage opening (and IRWST water injection) thus constituting an additional line of defense. 
Moreover, avoiding stage 4 opening, the impact of the selected accidents to the 
containment would be lower allowing for a faster plant recovery, with a considerable 
impact on plant availability. Finally RNS failure during the accident, once it has been 
aligned and it is operating, has also been considered in order to investigate its impact on 
accident behavior.  
The following section 5.1 summarizes how the RNS can prevent ADS stage 4 actuation, 
while sections 5.2 and 5.3 report simulation results for the inadvertent ADS actuation and 
the 1” SBLOCA cases respectively.      
 
5.1. RNS impact on ADS stage 4 actuation 
As described in section 1.1, in case of a LOCA, the CMTs are automatically actuated. 
During a LOCA, the CMTs start to operate in their first mode of operation (water 
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recirculation mode) until saturation conditions are reached within the RCS. Then the 
pressure balance lines void and CMTs start to operate in their second mode of operation 
(water draindown mode). At this point the water level in the CMTs starts decreasing.   
The AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) logic actuates the ADS first 
stage whenever the water level in the CMTs reaches the low-1 set point (67.5 % of CMT 
volume, Westinghouse 2010). The second and third stages open based on suitable time 
delays after actuation of stage one. The 4
th
 stage, instead, is opened whenever the CMTs 
water level reaches the low-2 set-point, i. e. 20 % of CMTs volume (Westinghouse, 2010). 
Looking at Figure 71 it can be seen that there are two check valves between the CMT 
discharge and the RNS connection point to the Direct Vessel Injection Line (DVI). The 
only way to prevent ADS 4
th
  stage actuation is to avoid the CMTs water level reaching the 
low-2 level set-point which, in turn, can be obtained closing the downstream check valve 
before the set-point is reached and keeping it closed. Since the RNS connection point to the 
DVI is downstream of the check valves, the head developed by the RNS pumps, together 
with the friction pressure drops generated in the piping between the RNS connection point 
and the Reactor Pressure Vessel, could be used to generate a backpressure on the second 
check valve, high enough to close and keep it closed while the water level in the CMTs 
remains above the set-point.  
Because of the configuration of the CMTs loop, the water column which can be held up in 
the CMTs during RNS operation is function of the friction pressure drop generated in the 
path between the RNS-DVI connection and the DVI injection point to vessel. The RNS 
flow capacity is such that the developed pressure drops are high enough to maintain a 
water column in the CMTs higher than the water column corresponding to ADS stage 4 
actuation set point.  
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Figure 71: AP1000 passive safety injection system scheme 
 
Hence, the RNS is designed such that its availability can provide an additional success 
path, without demand on the ADS-4 and IRWST injection.   
The challenge is that RNS can only be aligned when the primary pressure has reached a 
pressure low enough so that the pump discharge pressure, pumping from a water storage 
source, overcomes the RCS pressure (this will occur when the RCS pressure is below 1.28 
MPaa (185 psia)) and when the RCS temperature drops below the RNS design temperature, 
450 K (350 °F).  
Hence a complete and detailed simulation of the selected transients (1” SBLOCA and ADS 
inadvertent actuation) is needed in order to investigate if RCS conditions allowing RNS 
effectiveness are reached before CMTs water level drops below the stage 4 actuation set-
point and, once aligned, RNS is capable to close the check valve and keep it closed for an 
indefinite period of time. 
As explained above, RNS is designed to provide an additional line of defense for more 
common (intact loop) transients, in order to prevent the requirement on passive systems.  
Demonstrating RNS capability in preventing ADS stage 4 actuation also for the two 
selected uncommon accidents (ADS inadvertent actuation and the 1” SBLOCA) would 
mean not only that the AP1000 can provide an additional line of defense also for more 
uncommon accidents, but it also provides for greater availability of the plant in the case of 
more un-frequent faults accelerating the plant recovery and return to operation.   
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Additionally, as demonstrated in the following analyses, using the RNS will not result in a 
reduction of plant safety as the passive systems remain available to actuate should the 
conditions in the plant require so. If the RNS stops providing injection to the RCS, the 
check valves isolating the CMTs will re-open, the level in the CMTs will progressively 
drop and will eventually reach the ADS stage 4 actuation set-point, allowing IRWST 
injection later on. 
 
5.2. ADS inadvertent actuation: accident analysis 
The ADS inadvertent actuation has been simulated by means of the Relap5 computer code 
using the developed AP1000
 
model. The accident occurs being the plant operating at full 
power. The possibility to align RNS has been credited 1000 s
10
 after the first safety 
injection, making RNS capable to actually inject into the RCS whenever the RCS pressure 
has become lower than 1.28 MPa and RCS temperature lower than 450 K. Simultaneously 
to RNS actuation, operator actions are credited to start a controlled cooldown of the SGs 
secondary side using the SGs PORVs. 
In the following, a description of the main plant parameters trends is reported with 
particular attention on the CMTs, ADS and RNS behavior. 
At 0 s the ADS actuation signal occurs, causing reactor trip and CMTs actuation signal 
which in turn aligns the Passive Residual Heat Removal System (PRHR) (Westinghouse, 
2010). ADS first stage control valves start opening at 30 s. 
Figure 72 and Figure 73 show the ADS train A control valves mass flow rate and liquid 
fraction respectively (the same occurs for ADS train B). Stage 1 opens, discharging the 
loop seal water and then steam (liquid fraction goes to zero in Figure 73). Pure steam 
discharge from stage 1 control valve reaches its maximum when stage 1 reaches the fully 
open position. Then the discharged mass flow rate decreases because ADS is 
depressurizing the RCS (Figure 74). Eventually, stage 2 control valves start opening 
discharging the corresponding loop seals water and then steam. Because of ADS operation, 
saturation conditions are reached within the primary system (Figure 75). Pressurizer 
suddenly fills with water, as visible in Figure 76 and Figure 77 (initial negative surge line 
mass flow rate and level decreasing are due to reactor trip and PRHR and CMTs actuation) 
                                                          
10
 Maximum time for RNS alignment is 15 minutes, i. e. 900 s, after the first safety injection.  
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and a two phase mixture is discharged by the ADS, with a sudden increase in the 
discharged mass flow rate. The mass flow rate discharged by stage 1 and stage 2 reaches 
its maximum when stage 2 control valves have reached the fully open position. Then, 
because ADS operation is discharging primary coolant out of RCS, pressurizer level 
decreases, causing a reduction of the liquid fraction at the ADS valves so that the ADS 
mass flow rate, in turn, decreases. Then ADS stage 3 control valves start opening 
discharging a two-phase mixture. 
 
 
 
Figure 72: ADS train A stage 1, stage 2 and stage 3 mass flow rate [% of max flow] 
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Figure 73: liquid fraction at ADS train A stage 1, stage 2 and stage 3 control valves [-] 
 
 
 
Figure 74: RCS pressure [Pa] 
 
 
-2.00E-01
0.00E+00
2.00E-01
4.00E-01
6.00E-01
8.00E-01
1.00E+00
1.20E+00
1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+02 1.00E+03 1.00E+04 1.00E+05
li
q
u
id
 f
r
a
c
ti
o
n
 [
-]
time [s]
liquid fraction at ADS train A control valves
ADS 1A liquid fraction [-]
ADS 2A liquid fraction [-]
ADS 3A liquid fraction [-]
1.00E+05
1.00E+06
1.00E+07
1.00E+08
1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+02 1.00E+03 1.00E+04 1.00E+05
p
r
e
ss
u
r
e
 [
P
a
]
time [s]
Reactor Coolant System pressure 
Reactor Coolant System pressure [Pa]
 110 
 
 
Figure 75: RCS water temperature and saturation temperature [K] 
 
 
 
Figure 76: pressurizer surge line inlet mass flow rate [% of max flow] 
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Figure 77: pressurizer water level [% of span] 
 
 
Figure 78 shows the CMT A inlet and outlet mass flow rates (for CMT B it is practically 
the same). Initially CMTs operate in water recirculation mode, with hot water entering 
through the pressure balance line and cold water discharged to the DVI line. Eventually, 
because of the depressurization due to ADS operation, saturation conditions are reached 
within the RCS (Figure 75) with consequent void formation. In particular the pressure 
balance lines void (they are fed by steam, as shown in Figure 79) and CMTs start operating 
in their second mode of operation: draindown mode. The inlet mass flow rate practically 
stops, the discharged mass flow rate suddenly increases
11
 (Figure 78) and the CMTs water 
levels start decreasing (Figure 80).  
The RCS pressure drop allows also accumulators (ACCs) injection (Figure 81).  
 
                                                          
11
 Note that, when draining starts, the discharged mass flow rate suddenly increases, almost doubling its 
value during the recirculation phase. Then the discharged mass flow rate decreases because accumulators 
injection starts. Eventually, the discharged mass flow rate increases because the accumulators have voided.  
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Figure 78: CMT A balance line inlet and CMT A discharged mass flow rate [% of max flow] 
 
 
 
Figure 79: liquid fraction in CMT A pressure balance line inlet and CMT A discharge [-] 
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Figure 80: CMT A and CMT B water level [% of tank volume] 
 
 
 
Figure 81: accumulators discharged mass flow rate [% of max flow] 
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CMTs water level would continue to drop reaching the ADS stage 4 opening set point. 
ADS stage 4 would actuate discharging directly into the containment, ultimately 
depressurizing the RCS and allowing gravity head safety injection from the IRWST, 
securing the plant.  
However, in this analysis, RNS is postulated to be aligned after the first safety injection 
(CMTs injection in this case) but it can actually start injecting in the RCS whenever the 
primary pressure has reached a pressure low enough so that the pump discharge pressure, 
pumping from a water storage source, overcomes RCS pressure.  
Figure 74 shows the RCS pressure: ADS operation is responsible for the steep pressure 
reduction within the RCS. It can be seen that the RCS pressure soon becomes lower than 
1.28 MPaa (185 psia) setting the first condition for the potential RNS injection. Figure 82 
shows the loop 1 and loop 2 average temperatures: it can be seen that, soon after ADS 
actuation signal, the average temperatures start decreasing because of reactor trip and 
PRHR and CMTs actuation
12
. Then, because of ADS operation, saturation conditions are 
reached within the RCS and average temperatures decrease more steeply.  
When the postulated time delay from the first safety injection has passed so that operators 
can be credited for RNS alignment, conditions allowing RNS alignment and injection have 
already been reached so that RNS can inject into the RCS (Figure 83). The RNS injected 
mass flow rate stabilizes with an RCS pressure of about 0.4-0.5 MPaa. The mass flow rate 
is such that the created friction pressure drops between the RNS-DVI tee and the DVI 
injection point to vessel are high enough to close the CMTs discharge check valves and 
keep them closed, so that CMTs stop draining before ADS stage 4 actuation level setpoint 
is reached. Then RNS continues to cooldown and refill the RCS (pressurizer level 
recovered in Figure 77) and RCS refilling starts to involve CMTs also. In fact a mass flow 
rate through balance lines takes place (Figure 78) and CMTs water volume increases 
(Figure 80).  
                                                          
12
 CMTs and PRHR actuation occur at 2 s and this explains the temperature decrease after 2 s. Loop 1 
average temperature decreases slightly more than loop 2 average temperature since PRHR discharge flow 
rate is directed in loop 1 SG, and, from here, to loop 1 cold legs. At the beginning, since the loop 1 hot leg is 
full of water, the PRHR operates in single phase mode. At about 100-120 s some void starts to be present in 
loop 1 hot leg: PRHR starts operating in two-phase mode, condensing the two phase mixture coming from 
hot leg 1. This mode of operation is more efficient, the PRHR mass flow rate increases and this explains why 
the loop 1 average temperature drops more steeply around 100 s. Once the depressurization effect due to 
ADS operation becomes dominant, loop 1 and loop 2 average temperatures realign following the same trend.  
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At 15000 s the simulation is stopped since the phenomena of interest for this analysis 
(CMTs recirculation, CMTs draindown initiation, CMTs draindown stopped by RNS flow 
rate, etc.) have occurred, the beneficial action of RNS in avoiding ADS stage 4 actuation 
has been investigated and the plant is being stably cooled by RNS. 
 
Figure 82: loop 1 and loop 2 TAVG [K] 
 
 
Figure 83: RNS injected mass flow rate [% of max flow] 
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When investigating a suitable combination of active and passive systems, as done above, it 
is important to make sure also that, should the active feature fail during its operation, 
passive systems remain available and would restart operation, so that no safety issue is 
raised due to the “interaction” between passive and active systems.  
In particular it can be noted how the RNS actually inhibits the operation of a passive safety 
system, i. e. CMTs. If the RNS fails, CMTs should restart injecting even if plant conditions 
have been modified by RNS, and, in particular, are different from those conditions in 
which, normally, CMTs start operating. Hence it is essential to demonstrate that, should 
the RNS fail, CMTs would restart draining, leading to ADS stage 4 actuation and 
subsequent IRWST water injection. 
Since in principle RNS could fail at any time instant, hence at several different plant 
conditions, two bounding cases are considered: 
 CASE 1: early RNS failure, at 1600 s 
 CASE 2: late RNS failure, at 6000 s. 
The rationale for selecting these two bounding cases is to minimize the driving force for 
CMTs operation. As explained in section 1.1, if the cold legs are filled with water, CMTs 
operate in a water recirculation mode driven by the differential density due to the hot 
reactor coolant in the CMT balance line and the colder water within the CMT. If the cold 
legs become voided, as they do during LOCAs, the CMTs will operate in a steam-
displacement (or compensated) injection drain-down mode. In this mode, the driving force 
is based on gravity and the density difference between steam from the cold legs and water 
in the CMTs (Westinghouse 2010). 
Looking at the figures above it can be seen that for the early RNS failure (CASE 1), CMTs 
have reached the minimum inventory during the transient and the pressure balance lines 
are void. For the late RNS failure (CASE 2), CMTs, as well as the pressure balance lines, 
have become full of water.  
Normally (as occurs also in the here analyzed “base case” at the beginning of the transient) 
when CMTs start recirculation (i. e. CMTs and the pressure balance lines are full of water) 
the water temperature in the pressure balance lines is practically equal to the cold legs 
normal operation temperature while CMTs water is at ambient temperature. In the CASE 2 
here analyzed, CMTs and pressure balance lines have become full of water due to RNS 
operation: this means that the pressure balance lines water temperature is surely lower than 
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that of the cold legs during normal operation, i. e. the driving force to trigger CMTs 
recirculation is lower. 
Furthermore normally (as occurs also in the here analyzed “base case” at the beginning of 
the transient) when CMTs start draining they are full of water while the pressure balance 
lines have voided. In the CASE 1 here analyzed the pressure balance lines have voided but 
the CMTs water level is lower, i. e. the driving force for CMTs draindown is lower.   
Hence it has to be demonstrated that, should the RNS fail, the reduced driving forces for 
CMTs operation do not affect adversely the course of the accident.       
Figure 84 and Figure 85 show the RNS mass flow rate and CMT A inlet/outlet mass flow 
rates for CASE 1 (early RNS failure). It can be seen that as soon as the RNS mass flow rate 
stops, the CMTs injection restart. CMTs water level in turn decreases rapidly (Figure 86) 
reaching the ADS stage IV actuation set-point, i. e. 20% of CMTs water volume. Then 
ADS stage 4 starts discharging the primary coolant to the containment (Figure 87) and 
when the RCS pressure becomes lower than the IRWST water head, the gravity driven 
discharge from IRWST to RCS starts (Figure 88). Once the RCS is cooled by IRWST 
injection the transient can be considered secured. 
  
 
Figure 84: RNS injected mass flow rate for CASE 1 [% of max flow] 
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Figure 85: CMT A balance line inlet and CMT A discharged mass flow rate for CASE 1 [% 
of max flow] 
 
 
 
Figure 86: CMT A and CMT B water level for CASE 1 [% of tank volume] 
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Figure 87: ADS stage 4 mass flow rate for CASE 1 [% of max flow] 
 
 
 
Figure 88: IRWST to RCS mass flow rate for CASE 1 [% of max flow] 
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rates for CASE 2 (late RNS failure). It can be seen that, in this case, in which the CMTs 
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stopped CMTs draining does not start immediately, as it was for CASE 1. This can be 
more easily seen in Figure 91 in which the CMT A inlet and outlet mass flow rate in the 
time frame [6000 s; 8000 s] is reported. It can be noted that, as soon as RNS is stopped, 
CMTs start operating in water recirculation mode, with a strongly reduced mass flow rate 
in comparison to that experienced at the beginning of the transient because of the reduced 
driving force (see discussion above). Then an oscillating trend is present for few minutes 
until the pressure balance lines stably void (Figure 92) and CMTs drain with a stable 
increased mass flow rate (Figure 91). Once draindown is triggered CMTs water level 
decreases again (Figure 93 and Figure 94) until ADS stage 4 actuation set-point is reached 
and ADS stage 4 is actuated (Figure 95). When the RCS pressure becomes lower than the 
IRWST water head the gravity driven discharge from IRWST to RCS start (Figure 96). 
Once the RCS is cooled by IRWST injection the transient can be considered secured. 
 
 
Figure 89: RNS injected mass flow rate for CASE 2 [% of max flow] 
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Figure 90: CMT A balance line inlet and CMT A discharged mass flow rate for CASE 2 [% 
of max flow] 
 
 
 
Figure 91: CMT A balance line inlet and CMT A discharged mass flow rate for CASE 2 [% 
of max flow] (zoom 5500 s to 8000 s) 
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Figure 92: liquid fraction in CMT A pressure balance line inlet and CMT A discharge for 
CASE 2 [-] (zoom 5500 s to 8000 s) 
 
 
 
Figure 93: CMT A and CMT B water level for CASE 2 [% of tank volume] 
 
0.00E+00
2.00E-01
4.00E-01
6.00E-01
8.00E-01
1.00E+00
1.20E+00
5.50E+03 6.00E+03 6.50E+03 7.00E+03 7.50E+03 8.00E+03
li
q
u
id
 f
r
a
c
ti
o
n
 [
-]
time [s]
CMT A balance line and discharge line liquid fraction
CMT inlet liquid fraction [-]
CMT outlet liquid fraction [-]
RNS failure
-2.00E+01
0.00E+00
2.00E+01
4.00E+01
6.00E+01
8.00E+01
1.00E+02
1.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.00E+02 1.00E+03 1.00E+04 1.00E+05
w
a
te
r
 l
e
v
e
l 
[%
 o
f 
ta
n
k
 v
o
lu
m
e
]
time [s]
CMTs water level
CMT A liquid level [%]
CMT B liquid level [%]
RNS failure
 123 
 
 
Figure 94: CMT A and CMT B water level for CASE 2 [% of tank volume] (zoom 5500 s to 
8000 s) 
 
 
 
Figure 95: ADS stage 4 mass flow rate for CASE 2 [% of max flow] 
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Figure 96: IRWST to RCS mass flow rate for CASE 2 [% of max flow] 
Results demonstrate that, for the selected accident, the availability of the RNS reduces the 
direct impact on the containment. In fact RNS operation avoids ADS stage 4 actuation, 
improving plant recovery after the accident. This is particularly important for this accident: 
in fact the first three stages which open following an inadvertent ADS actuation signal 
discharge RCS inventory in the IRWST with a very limited direct impact to the 
containment. Avoiding stage 4 actuation (which would affect directly containment 
atmosphere since stage 4 squib valves discharge directly in the containment loops 
compartments) would keep limited the direct impact of this DBA for the containment 
allowing a faster plant recovery and, hence, increasing plant availability.  
It has also been demonstrated that failure of RNS during its operation is followed by a 
restart of the operation of passive safety systems: in fact, upon failure of RNS, CMTs 
draining recommences and ADS stage 4 actuates allowing IRWST water injection. 
 
5.3. 1” SBLOCA: accident analysis 
In this paragraph a detailed description of the transient following the occurrence of a 1” 
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operating at nominal conditions. Operators are assumed to align RNS 1000 s
13
 after the 
first safety injection (CMTs actuation in this case). RNS pumps can inject in the RCS when 
pressure has become lower than 1.28 MPaa and temperature lower than 450 K. At that time 
operators are also assumed to start a controlled cooldown of SGs secondary side using SGs 
PORVs. The transient is terminated at 19500 s as the major plant parameters have 
stabilized and the main phenomena have occurred.   
The pressurizer level response is shown in Figure 97. As a result of the break flow, 
pressurizer level rapidly decreases. PRZ low level causes CMTs actuation signal and, with 
few seconds delay, CMTs discharge valves opening, reactor trip and PRHR initiation. 
Reactor trip causes FW isolation and turbine trip. Pressurizer remains completely empty 
until ADS control valves open depressurizing the RCS: the pressurizer level increases to 
about 80% because of the void formation in the RCS, due to RCS depressurization by ADS 
operation. Further the pressurizer level tends to decrease but the injection from the CMTs 
and the accumulators maintains the level at about 50-60 %. When RCS conditions allow 
RNS injection (see below), PRZ level newly increases: at about 14000 s the PRZ is full of 
water. 
 
 
Figure 97: PRZ water level [% of span] 
 
                                                          
13
 Maximum time for RNS alignment is 15 minutes, i. e. 900 s, after the first safety injection.  
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RCS and SG pressure response are shown in Figure 98. The RCS pressure decreases 
rapidly, mainly because of the break and the reactor trip. Afterwards it stabilizes for some 
time around SGs pressure, to start decreasing again because of the break and RCS 
cooldown due to safety systems. 
When ADS valves begin to open, RCS pressure rapidly decreases, while when RNS 
injection starts (same time after ADS actuation), SGs PORVs are opened for a controlled 
SGs secondary side cooldown: SGs pressure goes down.  
 
Figure 98: PRZ steam dome and SGs steam dome pressure [Pa] 
 
The hot leg and two of the cold legs temperatures (1A and 2A) are shown in Figure 99. 
Prior to reactor trip and safety injection by CMTs and PRHR, the temperatures are 
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(about 554 K, i. e. about 537 F): actually they slightly decrease because of the break. 
After the reactor trip, the cold leg temperatures decrease due to the cooldown. The cold leg 
temperature in loop 2 remains higher than the one in loop 1 of about 50-55 K. Decay heat 
removal occurs primarily via natural circulation. The natural circulation stops because of 
ADS operation, which is responsible for the sharp temperature decrease visible in Figure 
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than 1.28 MPaa (Figure 98) and both loops TAVG lower than 450 K (Figure 100): RNS 
injection starts (Figure 101).  
 
 
 
Figure 99: hot and cold legs water temperature [K] 
 
 
 
Figure 100: loop 1 and loop 2 TAVG [K] 
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Figure 101: RNS injected mass flow rate [% of max flow] 
 
The response of the core level is illustrated in Figure 102. Initially the core exit region is 
subcooled as shown in Figure 103. Afterwards RCS subcooling goes to zero and some void 
forms in the core upper portion (Figure 104): core level slightly decreases (Figure 102). 
Core level is then recovered because of RNS injection. It has to be noted that the minimum 
liquid fraction in the uppermost region of the core is about 60%: this does not cause any 
problem for core cooling.    
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Figure 102: core level [% of max level] 
 
 
 
Figure 103: RCS subcooling [K]
14
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Figure 104: liquid fraction in the upper portion of the core [-] 
 
The hot legs flow is shown in Figure 105. In particular, looking also at Figure 106, it can 
be noted that hot leg 1 mass flow rate is practically equal to PRHR mass flow rate until 
PRHR is active, hence until ADS actuation occurs. Then hot leg 1 mass flow is equal to 
ADS mass flow rate, which in turn, is practically equal to RNS injected mass flow rate: 
RCS conditions stabilize with a mass flow rate injected by RNS and discharged by ADS 
(PRZ full of water, see also above) and, only for a small part, by the break (see the 
following). 
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Figure 105: hot leg 1 and hot leg 2 mass flow rate [% of max flow] 
 
 
 
Figure 106: hot leg 1, PRHR inlet, ADS train A inlet and RNS injected mass flow rate [% of 
max flow] 
 
The break, CVS, ADS train A and RNS injected mass flow rate are shown in Figure 107. 
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isolation (on PRZ high-1 water level, reached because of ADS operation and induced void 
formation in RCS), the CVS operates at its nominal capacity. The flow rate exiting the 
break is significantly bigger than that injected by means of the CVS, which cannot sustain 
reactor pressure and PRZ level: this causes reactor trip and safety systems actuation. When 
ADS is actuated, primary coolant swelling causes CVS isolation and also the break flow 
becomes significantly lower. When RNS starts injecting only a small portion of the 
injected flow is discharged by the break: hence practically all the water injected by RNS is 
discharged by ADS.  
 
 
Figure 107: break, CVS, ADS train A and RNS injected mass flow rate [% of max flow] 
 
In Figure 108 the accumulators flow rates are shown. It can be noted that the accumulators 
begin to operate at about 5000 s when the pressure conditions promote the injection, but 
only at about 12200 s, because of ADS operation, the high depressurization allows a 
consistent mass flow rate from the accumulators. At about 12900 s the accumulators are 
empty. 
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Figure 108: ACC 1 and ACC 2 discharged mass flow rate [% of max flow] 
Figure 109 shows the CMT A inlet and outlet mass flow rates (for CMT B the trends are 
similar). Initially CMTs operate in water recirculation mode until when some void starts to 
be present at pressure balance line inlet. The CMTs inlet and outlet mass flow rates present 
an oscillating trend from about 8200 s to about 12200 s when, because of ADS actuation 
and consequent void formation in RCS, the pressure balance lines are fed by steam and 
CMTs drain. 
Figure 110 shows the CMTs water level. CMTs remain full of water up to about 10000 s. 
Then CMT B starts to drain slowly, reaching 67.5 % of tank volume (i. e. low-1 level). The 
asymmetric behavior of the two CMTs id due to the break size and location
15
. As explained 
also for the CMTs hot recirculation test, once the mass flow rate coming from SG-2 
practically zeros, the CMTs are fed mainly by the water coming from the RPV upper 
downcomer (reverse flow from cold legs). For the affected (by the break) cold leg, the 
RPV, in addition to the water “required” by the corresponding pressure balance line, 
supplies also the water “required” by break. In fact, for a so small break, the RPV can be 
considered as a reservoir which supplies water to the different “users”, CMTs pressure 
balance lines and break in particular. The point is that the RPV the water temperature is 
decreasing because of the safety system operation and the break depressurization and 
                                                          
15
 It is recalled that the break is supposed in the cold leg 2A (CMT region). CMT A is connected to cold leg 
2A, while CMT B is connected to the intact cold leg 2B.  
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cooling effect. Hence in the affected cold leg (cold leg 2A), which “requires” more mass 
flow rate in comparison to the intact one (because of the break), the temperature is slightly 
lower than the temperature in the intact one (cold leg 2B). Hence it is in the intact cold leg 
that some steam starts to be present, which, feeding the corresponding pressure balance 
line, trigger the draindown of CMT B. This leads to the ADS actuation signal and, in turn, 
to the ADS stage 1 control valves opening, followed by stage 2 and stage 3 control valves 
after short time delays.  
Figure 111 shows the mass flow rate discharged by ADS train A control valves (the same 
applies for train B). ADS depressurization enhances CMTs draining: CMTs start to void 
very rapidly (see the change of water level derivative for CMT B once ADS actuates in 
Figure 110). 
Because of ADS depressurization and cooling effect, RCS pressure and temperature 
decrease rapidly reaching soon the values allowing RNS pumps to inject water into RCS 
from cask loading pit (Figure 101). RNS water injection, because of the pressure drops 
from RNS-DVI tee to DVI injection point to vessel, creates enough friction so that CMTs 
check valves close, CMTs draining stops and level in CMTs stabilizes. CMT A level 
reaches about 33% of tank volume at the end of the transient, while CMT B level stops at 
about 25%. Hence ADS stage 4 is not actuated and the plant is stably cooled by the RNS.   
 
Figure 109: CMT A balance line and CMT A discharged mass flow rate [% of max flow] 
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Figure 110: CMT A and CMT B water volume [% of tank volume] 
 
 
 
Figure 111: ADS train A stage 1, stage 2 and stage 3 mass flow rate [% of max flow] 
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Also for this accident as done in section 5.2 for the ADS inadvertent actuation, it is 
essential to demonstrate that, should the RNS fail, the CMTs would restart operation 
without any problem (see the discussion in section 5.2). 
In the present case, upon failure of RNS, CMTs should recommence draining from a level 
lower than that at which normally they start draining (as occurred soon after ADS stages 
1,2,3 actuation in the “base case” here analyzed), i. e. with a lower driving force. 
Hence a failure of the RNS has been assumed at 17100 s, some time after its operation 
started. 
Figure 112 and Figure 113 show the RNS mass flow rate and CMT A inlet/outlet mass 
flow rates. It can be seen that as soon as the RNS mass flow rate stops, the CMTs injection 
restart (see also Figure 114). CMTs water level in turn decreases rapidly (Figure 115) 
reaching the ADS stage IV actuation set-point. Then ADS stage 4 starts discharging the 
primary coolant to the containment (Figure 116) and when the RCS pressure becomes 
lower than the IRWST water head, the gravity driven discharge from IRWST to RCS starts 
(Figure 117). Once the RCS is cooled by IRWST injection the transient can be considered 
secured.  
 
 
Figure 112: RNS mass flow rate [% of max flow], with RNS failure at 17100 s 
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Figure 113: CMT A balance line and CMT A discharged mass flow rate [% of max flow], 
with RNS failure at 17100 s 
 
 
Figure 114: CMT A balance line and CMT A discharged mass flow rate [% of max flow], 
with RNS failure at 17100 s (zoom 1700 s to 19000 s) 
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Figure 115: CMT A and CMT B water volume [% of tank volume], with RNS failure at 
17100 s 
 
Figure 116: ADS stage 4 mass flow rate [% of max flow], with RNS failure at 17100 s 
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Figure 117: IRWST to RCS mass flow rate [% of max flow], with RNS failure at 17100 s 
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6. Conclusions and perspectives 
The very first milestone of the present work has been the development of a fully detailed 
Relap5 AP1000 model, which can be used to simulate a variety of steady state and 
transient conditions. The developed AP1000 input model has been extensively used in this 
work, which can be thought as divided in two main parts. 
The first part regards the simulation of three pre-operational tests, namely: 
1) Core Make-up Tanks hot recirculation test 
2) Core Make-up Tanks draindown test 
3) Automatic Depressurization System test 
which will be performed on the first three built AP1000 nuclear power plants. The AP1000 
licensing process, in fact, requires that proper operation of passive systems is demonstrated 
by means of dedicated pre-operational tests, to be performed on the first three built plants 
to obtain the Combined Construction and Operating License (COL). The present work 
covers one of the steps for AP1000 COL, since tests procedures have been developed and 
pre-tests calculations have been performed for the selected tests. The simulations results 
confirm that the selected boundary and initial conditions, as well as tests procedures, are 
suitable for a successful performance of the tests. 
In particular the CMTs ability to operate in single phase natural circulation to provide 
immediate coolant make up and boration following Non-LOCA and LOCA events is well 
visible in the CMTs hot recirculation test simulation. Furthermore the CMTs transition 
from hot recirculation mode of operation to draindown mode of operation, and subsequent 
CMTs draining, has been demonstrated in the CMTs draindown test simulation. Finally the 
main phenomena expected for the ADS operation are captured in the ADS test.  
Even if the selected tests concern the AP1000 and its licensing process, the framework is 
absolutely more general and easily extendable to future, generation IV, nuclear plants. In 
fact passive safety systems employment is a characteristic which will be increasing in the 
future nuclear generation and a licensing process for future (Generation IV) nuclear power 
plants could be preliminarily envisaged: in such a process, no power operation should be 
allowed if, at least on the first built plant, proper operation of the first of a kind systems has 
been demonstrated by means of dedicated pre-operational tests, with no compromise on the 
scaling issue but looking at the real and whole plant response/behavior. Hence it will be 
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essential, as done in this work for the AP1000, to develop tests procedures which on one 
side allow for a clear demonstration of the effectiveness of the selected feature, but, on the 
other, do not unduly stress the plant. To this scope, pre-tests (and post-tests) calculations 
will be fundamental, as it was shown here for the AP1000.      
The second part of this thesis has been focused on the simulation of two AP1000 Design 
Basis Accidents, namely 
1. 1” SBLOCA 
2. Inadvertent Automatic Depressurization System Actuation. 
The selected accidents were already analyzed in the AP1000 Design Certification 
Document, postulating, as for all AP1000 Design Basis Accidents, the failure of all the 
active systems and coping against the accidents relying only on passive features. In this 
thesis instead, the availability of an active system, the Normal Residual Heat Removal 
System (RNS) has been considered in order to evaluate its impact on the transients 
progression, and in particular the capability to mitigate it. It has been demonstrated that the 
availability of the RNS can secure the selected accidents without ADS stage 4 opening and 
subsequent IRWST water injection. In fact, for the selected accidents, RNS can be aligned 
before the CMTs level reaches the ADS stage 4 activation set-point and once aligned the 
generated friction pressure drops are high enough to stop CMTs draining. This is particular 
important since avoiding actuation of ADS stage 4, which discharges directly into the 
containment loops compartments (differently from the first three ADS stages which 
discharge in the IRWST), limits the direct impact of the selected accidents to the 
containment, allowing a faster plant recovery. Furthermore the use of the RNS constitutes 
an additional and independent line of defense, which, as demonstrated, does not adversely 
impact on the “normal” passive management of DBAs in the AP1000 design. In fact, 
should the RNS fail during its operation, CMTs draining would restart, ADS 4
th
 stage 
would open and IRWST water would be passively (by gravity) injected terminating the 
transient.  
Also here, even if the calculations have been performed for the AP1000, the framework is 
absolutely general and easily extendable to the generation III+ and generation IV nuclear 
plants which will use extensively passive safety systems.  
In fact we should distinguish the licensing strategy of a plant from the practical accident 
management. The nuclear safety authority, in fact, dictates that some dedicated safety 
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systems, be them active or passive, to be employed in order to protect the plant against 
selected design basis accidents. Even if a certain mix between passive and active features 
always existed (e. g. the gravity driven control rods for reactor shutdown and the 
accumulators for emergency injection from one side, and the High Pressure Injection 
System and the Low Pressure Injection System from the other), the first nuclear power 
plants generations (I, II and III) have relied mostly on active safety features for emergency 
core and containment cooling. Most of the generation III+ and IV systems, instead, rely on 
passive safety features to accomplish emergency core and containment cooling. What is 
important to note is that, in the licensing process of the plant, the safety authority requires 
the licensee to demonstrate the safety of the plant relying only on those features clearly 
identified as “safety related” and which have been designed specifically for that purpose. 
All the other systems, even if they could be available following an accident, are assumed to 
fail and do not give any contribution to the accident resolution. For the AP1000 this means 
that Westinghouse has demonstrated the safety of the plant assuming the failure of all the 
active systems, relying only on the passive ones, which are the only systems specifically 
designed as safety related. All this, as said, in the licensing process of the plant.  
When coming to the practical accident management procedures design, any conceptual 
dichotomy between active and passive systems should always be avoided and any possible 
interaction between active and passive systems and between safety related and not safety 
related systems should always be considered in order to evaluate the corresponding effects. 
In fact a suitable mix between active and passive systems can lead to a better outcome of 
the accident, as it was for the cases analyzed in this work for the AP1000 in which some 
passive features (CMTs and ADS first three stages) “control” the plant until an active 
system (the RNS) can be aligned and provide a better plant response in comparison to what 
would happen postulating a completely passive transient management.  
Anyway it should be highly stressed that in principle the interaction between active and 
passive features could lead also to adverse effects. In fact, also looking to the analyzed 
cases, the RNS, an active not safety related system, actually stops a passive safety related 
system operation (CMTs draining). What is important is to make sure that should the 
active feature become un-available, the possibly affected passive systems would 
recommence operation without any problem. This is the case for the selected transients but, 
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in principle, any possible adverse effect of interaction between active and passive safety 
features should be taken into account to avoid and excluding it.   
Concluding, in a scenario in which, most likely, the use of passive safety features for future 
nuclear systems will increase, any possible interaction of these features with the active 
ones should always be analyzed in order to evaluate any possible positive or adverse effect. 
Even if not at a licensing level, this should be performed at least at the accident 
management procedures design level, exploring all the possibilities for a full exploitation 
of the defense-in-depth principle.             
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